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PREFACE
t is a particular pleasure to present this fourth report issued by the
CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group. As has been our practice for
several years now, we have brought together a distinguished group of
economists to produce a thorough analysis of the key challenges facing
economic policy-makers in the EU.
Last year’s report drew attention to the disappointing growth prospects
for Europe. It is no source of satisfaction that this point of view was so
strongly validated during 2001, when the euro area had a truly dismal
productivity record. In this year’s report we analyse some competing
explanations for the productivity slowdown in Europe. We must admit,
however, that we have not found a single satisfactory explanation for this
development. Whatever its causes, slower productivity means fewer
resources available for redistribution, which in turn has implications for
monetary and fiscal policy. For example, the surprising persistence of
inflation early in 2002 should be seen as one of the consequences,
implying that it has become harder for monetary policy to maintain price
stability.  But this year’s report also makes other important contributions
and presents some surprising new findings on the effectiveness, or rather
ineffectiveness of fiscal policy.
The main reason why it is a particular pleasure to announce this report is
that in 2002 the MPG will produce a second, special report dealing with
the issues raised by the enlargement of the eurozone. This special report
will come out in the autumn and will discuss how the entry of the UK
might affect the nature of the eurozone economy and how one can
maintain the efficiency of the decision-making organ of the ECB after the
next wave of enlargement, which will bring the number of potential euro
area members to 25. The Governing Council might then end up having
more than 30 members – not exactly the ideal size to manage monetary
policy in the context of fast-moving financial markets. Be on the look out
later this year for our recommendations on this point!
The Group is grateful for the comments from participants attending an
off-the-record seminar organised by Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt, in
particular Dr. Martin Hüfner, Prof. Dr. Otmar Issing and Prof. Dr. Axel
Weber. The Group also thanks Prof. Dr. Ansgar Belke for the
econometrics in section 3 of Chapter 2. Peer Ritter provided excellent
research assistance. All remaining errors are ours.
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The work of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group would not have
been possible without the support of two sponsors, Deutsche Bank and
UBS. I wish to thank them for their material and financial contributions,
which enable us to prepare two high-quality reports this year.
Daniel Gros
Director, CEPS
Brusselsiii
POLICY CONCLUSIONS AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Policy Conclusions
The eurozone is currently experiencing conditions close to stagflation:
growth is below potential and inflation remains stubbornly above the
European Central Bank’s target of 2%. Fiscal deficits are also increasing
again as consolidation fatigue sets in. One of the key underlying causes of
this unhappy combination is the collapse of productivity growth in 2001.
To cope with this difficult situation, tough issues will have to be tackled
in a number of policy areas. We specifically recommend the following:
The current monetary policy stance is broadly appropriate even if
inflation has long been above the 2% limit set by the ECB. Shocks and
the disappointing slowdown in productivity account for that. But the
strategy is misguided because the 2% threshold is too low. Instead the
goal of the ECB should become:
•  To keep year-on-year core inflation at 1.5% with a tolerance band of
±1%.
This would still make the ECB more ambitious than most other central
banks with an explicit inflation target.
Fiscal policy has also come to the forefront of policy discussions in
Europe. Our research indicates that the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a
tool of demand management has fallen over the last decades. Increases in
government spending are now unlikely to have any positive impact on
overall demand, while they almost certainly have a negative impact on
private demand. Whether or not fiscal policy has any impact on inflation
is difficult to say. Given this uncertainty we conclude that:
•  the elaborate procedures currently in place to discuss fiscal policy at
the European level are, at best, of little use, and
•  calls for even-tighter fiscal policy coordination in the euro area
should be resisted.
Some large Euroland countries seem on the point of ignoring the Stability
Pact and their own commitments to approximate balance over the cycle.
There is no justification for this behaviour at this point since the recovery
has already started. The announced deviations from the Stability Pact
programmes are minor (less than one half of 1% of GDP). Nevertheless,FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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they could still have a substantial negative effect on interest rates if
financial markets perceive that they signal a change in the trend towards
fiscal consolidation. Structural budget deficits must be brought into
balance. Tax cuts must be accompanied by spending cuts.
Restoring productivity growth in Euroland can only be achieved through
a removal of supply-side distortions, particularly through progress in
labour market reforms. The complicated EU-wide processes that are
supposed to foster this progress through peer pressure and learning from
best practice are at best useless and may even make matters worse as they
foster policies that put more bureaucrats to work than the unemployed.
Executive Summary
1.  Stagnation of the European economy
The ‘new economy’ seems alive and well in the US. Output per man-hour
continued to rise throughout the recession, and the rebound of early 2002
sent productivity growth to a record pace (+8% in Q1). By contrast in
Europe, productivity growth has fallen close to zero.
Is this striking divergence just a reflection of the business cycle?
Evidence points to the contrary. In the US the long upswing raised the
question of whether the bulk of the observed increase in productivity was
simply a cyclical phenomenon. The fact that productivity growth held up
during the sharp slowdown of 2001 answers that question: the
acceleration of productivity growth was not simply a cyclical
phenomenon.
How about Europe? In Europe there was no acceleration of productivity
to explain and the deceleration of demand in Europe was far less marked
than in the US. But productivity is far more cyclical in Europe. When this
is taken into account, the Euroland productivity figures for 2001 look
bad. Indeed so bad that they convey a strong message: there can be no
doubt about a strong decline of trend productivity in Euroland.
There has been some complacency in Europe about ‘employment
content’ of growth. Is this really a good thing, particularly when it is
recalled that it is merely the counterpart of the lower productivity growth
described above? A higher employment content of growth is a good sign
only in so far as it reflects a structural change in labour markets (getting
lower-productivity workers back to work). Unfortunately, we do not find
evidence that this has happened. So why has productivity growth slowed
in Europe while it has increased in the US?EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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It is not for a lack of enthusiasm for the ‘new economy’ in Europe.
Indeed, investment in information technology has considerably increased.
Rather, a productivity paradox seems to be emerging. (Most of) Europe
has caught up with the US in terms of IT spending, but the productivity
gap is actually widening. The persistence of rigidities in labour and goods
markets in Europe stands as the prime suspect for this paradox.
2.  The dilemma for monetary policy: Stagnation plus inflation?
Growth has fallen during 2001 and is likely to stay below even the
meagre potential of Euroland during 2002. But core inflation has
remained so far stubbornly above the 2% ECB threshold, defying the
expectations of a quick fall in early 2002. This has not happened so far
(but should happen later in the year), possibly because of a succession of
one-off shocks – including last but not least, the euro ‘rounding’ effect in
the services sector, where prices are now rising above 3%. The current
policy stance is appropriate if inflation does indeed decline significantly.
If this does not happen and core inflation fails to decline, action would
definitely be called for.
This is the conclusion emerging from the analysis of several indicators,
from the short-term real interest rate to the monetary conditions index
(MCI), which takes into account the impact of developments in the euro.
Currently, monetary conditions are rather lax as the still-high inflation
has lead to a fall in real (ex-post) interest rates. If inflation falls, as
foreseen, and the euro continues in its rising trend, monetary conditions
will ‘automatically’ become tighter, even without an increase in policy
rates on the part of the ECB.
Turning to money growth, which attracts so much attention because of its
prominent role in the communications emanating from the ECB, the
acceleration of M3 during 2001 seems to have been related to an increase
in liquidity preference, spurred by enhanced uncertainty, rather than
signalling inflation risks. In the event it was very sensible to de facto
ignore money growth that was twice as fast as the ECB’s own reference
value and to cut interest rates. Yet it would have been much better to
acknowledge it openly (as repeatedly advocated by us, among many
others), rather than insisting on discussing technical points of monetary
analysis in press communiqués.
Policy decisions have recently been better explained, especially since the
November 2001 decision by the governing Council, but the steps in
improving clarity in communications have been much more timid than
they could and should have been.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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One tenet of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy is that inflation should
be in the 0-2% range. But does an upper limit of 2% make sense? With
productivity growth nearly disappearing, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to achieve, as increases in nominal wages now must lead
immediately to price increases.
Moreover, the systematic difference between inflation in the services and
goods sectors (on average 2% per annum in most of Euroland over the
last 20 years) poses yet another problem to the 2% limit for total,
headline inflation. Many sectors in the economy may have to be in (or
very close to) deflation in order to meet the target for the total.
3.  Fiscal policy: Is it a useful policy tool?
The 2001 slowdown was short and shallow. But, despite that, it triggered
very strong calls to use fiscal policy to manage short-term demand. A
necessary (and we would argue not sufficient) condition for these calls to
be justified is confidence that fiscal policy is actually effective. Our
analysis shows that this confidence has flimsy empirical support, if any.
Our results indicate that the multipliers do not deserve to be called
multipliers, because it appears that an increase of government
expenditure (purchases of goods and services) equivalent to 1% of GDP
will lead, at most, to an increase in demand of a little more than 1%. As
government purchases are themselves part of GDP, a ‘multiplier’ of one
indicates that higher public expenditure have a zero impact on private
demand. Moreover, the effectiveness is declining over time and, over the
last 20 years, it is actually difficult to find any significant positive impact
of fiscal policy on output at all, suggesting in many cases a more-than-
100% crowding out. We also find that it is impossible to say whether or
not fiscal policy has any impact on inflation.
Fiscal policy should not be used as a tool for active demand management.
The exact sign and size of our estimates can of course be disputed, but in
our opinion, it is more difficult to dismiss the qualitative result that,
contrary to the conventional wisdom embodied in large-scale
macroeconomic models, one knows very little about the actual effects of
fiscal policy on aggregate demand and prices. Given this ignorance, the
call for tighter co-ordination of national fiscal policies are at best
misguided. The elaborate procedures to discuss, at the European level,
fiscal policy may be well meaning in their objective but they look
cumbersome and pedantic as they presuppose a detailed knowledge of the
national and international effects of fiscal policies that is just not there.1
CHAPTER 1
THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
1. Introduction
It is well known that productivity trends on the two shores of the Atlantic
have diverged in recent years. Productivity growth has accelerated in the
US and slowed down in Europe. What is less widely appreciated is that
this divergence has now reached dramatic proportions. The latest US data
indicate that productivity per man-hour in the United States has gone up
by a spectacular 8.6% in the first quarter of 2002, improving upon the
already high 5.2% in the last quarter of 2001.
The data for the first quarter of 2002 are likely to have been exceptional,
aided by the sharp rebound. But the recent US data remain impressive
even on an annual basis. The current slowdown during 2001 brought
about an overall decline of 1.4 percentage points in the US growth rate of
labour productivity (from 3.3% in 2000 to 1.9% in 2001). Yet 1.9% is
still only half a percentage point smaller than the 1995-2000 average, the
brightest period for the US economy in the last 40 years.
In contrast, in the EU in 2001, real GDP per employed person has
increased by a mere 0.4%. The current slowdown in economic activity
has halved GDP growth (from 3.4% in 2000 to 1.7% in 2001), while
employment growth declined by a smaller amount (from 2% in 2000 to
1.3% in 2001). Productivity growth in 2001 was about one percentage
point lower than in the year 2000 (which, in turn, is very similar to its
1995-2000 average). The 0.4% labour productivity recorded in 2001 is
the lowest productivity growth rate in the EU since 1975, when EU
economies were wallowing in the aftermath of the first oil shock.
The 2001 slowdown brought productivity growth down to zero or even
negative figures in the large euro area countries, including Germany,
France, Italy and Spain, with the result that the euro area performed even
worse than the average EU-15. The EU-15 productivity growth remains
positive for 2001 mainly because productivity growth in the UK, Ireland
and Greece held up much better than in other member states.
Are the divergent productivity numbers, and in particular the dismal
number for Europe for 2001, just a reflection of the business cycle? There
is a stark contrast between the US and Europe. The long upswing in the
US raised the question of what part of the observed increase inFISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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productivity was simply a cyclical phenomenon. The fact that
productivity growth held up during the sharp slowdown of 2001 indicates
that it was not a cyclical phenomenon.
How about Europe? In Europe there was no acceleration of productivity
to explain. Moreover, the slowdown in demand was less pronounced in
Europe than in the US. In the US, growth fell by 3 percentage points, in
Europe by only about half as much (1.7). From this point of view, one
would have expected productivity to hold up better on this side of the
Atlantic. But this might be offset by the fact that productivity growth is
more cyclical in Europe. Hence the 2001 data for Euroland should be
corrected for the cycle.
Since labour markets are more rigid in Europe than in the United States,
one would expect productivity, as measured by output per employee, to
respond sharply to a slowdown: if it is not possible to fire people but
demand does not increase, output per employee should just be flat. Could
this explain the bad 2001 figures for Europe, and in particular for
Euroland? The short answer is no. The productivity figures for 2001 are
so bad that they contain a strong message: there can be no doubt about a
longer-run decline of productivity in Euroland. Box 1.1 reports the results
of a very simple statistical exercise, namely a simple regression of the
rate of growth of GDP per employee on a constant and GDP growth
using the over 40 observations between 1960 and 2001. The difference
between the value one would predict for 2001 on the basis of this
relationship and the actual value for that same year gives an indication of
the ‘excess slowdown’, or the acceleration of the decline in productivity
growth. This difference was equal to -1.1%, implying that output per
employee during 2001 was more than one full percentage point lower
than one would have expected given the ‘normal’ relationship between
the business cycle and productivity in the countries that form Euroland.
For the US, by contrast, actual productivity was 0.55% higher during
2001 than one would have expected given the normal relationship.
This simple, perhaps simplistic, statistical exercise shows that the dismal
2001 numbers for productivity in Europe are not just a fluke, or a
consequence of a bad business cycle.THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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Box 1.1  Regression analysis of the rate of growth of GDP/employee and GDP
growth
A simple regression of the rate of growth of GDP per employee on a constant
and GDP growth gives a coefficient for the latter variable of 0.83 in the eurozone
and 0.38 in the US (with extremely high t-statistics of 10.3 and 4.8, respectively:
period 1960-2001).
The results for the US were as follows:
Dependent variable:
Output per employee  Standard
Coefficients error t Stat     P-value
Intercept 0.30 0.32 0.95       0.35
GDP growth 0.38 0.08 4.84       0.00
Regression statistics
Adjusted R square: 0.36 Standard error:  1.07
Observations: 41
For the eurozone it turned out that one needs to include the first lag of the
dependent variable. This is not surprising given the time it takes to fire people in
most of Europe. When the lag of the dependent variable is also included as a
regressor, the impact coefficient becomes 0.62. For the US the inclusion of a lag
does not appear to be justified as it is not significant.
The results for the EU in detail were as follows:
Dependent variable:
Output per employee Standard
Coefficients error t Stat P-value
Intercept -0.12 0.28    -0.41 0.68
Lagged dependent  0.33   0.10     3.47   0.00
GDP growth  0.62   0.09     6.63   0.00
Regression statistics
Adjusted R square: 0.76 Standard error:   0.77
Observations: 39
Productivity performance and the business cycle : different surprises.
US Eurozone
Predicted Forecast error Predicted Forecast error
1999 1.85 0.35 1.93 -0.93
2000 1.88 0.22 2.41 -1.01
2001 0.75 0.55 1.39 -1.19
Columns 2 and 4 show the productivity growth predicted in the period from 1999
to 2001. The forecast errors are presented in colums 3 and 5.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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2.  Competing explanations for the slowdown in productivity
The disappointing recent numbers on productivity in Europe coincide
with another remarkable trend. Even during the long recovery of the
1995-2001 period, employment growth was substantially higher relative
to GDP growth than was the case in earlier decades.
1 For some observers
this is a blessing. In fact, many policy reports have called for a more
employment-intensive growth to solve the European unemployment
problem. It is argued that some euro area countries are now solving the
unemployment problem of the 1980s by incorporating workers back into
employment. The higher the employment intensity of growth, the lower
productivity growth is in the short run. And, while a fall in productivity
growth in the short run may be an indication of improvements in the
labour market, if the fall is sustained over the medium run then it will
eventually imply a drop in GDP per capita growth.
Thus, whether the productivity deceleration observed in the euro area
countries over the 1990s is a transitory phenomenon needed to restore
high employment rates or, on the contrary, is a permanent phenomenon
attributable to the inability of the euro area member countries to adopt
new technologies and reduce the technological deficit vis-à-vis the US,
has very important implications. Among these, there are two implications
that impinge directly upon monetary policy. First, while both an increase
of the employment rate towards its sustainable long-run level and an
acceleration of productivity yield a rise in potential output growth, the
effect on prices is different, since only productivity growth can moderate
unit labour costs, if labour costs were increasing. Secondly, the
productivity growth differential between the US and the euro area is often
cited as the main reason for the appreciation of the dollar/euro exchange
rate.
2 Thus, monetary policy needs to be aware of the sources of potential
output growth.
                                                          
1 In the eurozone as a whole, employment growth relative to GDP growth was
7.4%, 11.5%, and 32% during the 1960-73, 1974-89, and 1990-99 periods,
respectively.
2 In a recent paper, Alquist and Chinn (2002) estimate that each percentage point
in the US-euro area productivity differential results in a five percentage point
real appreciation of the dollar. This is consistent with a model in which
productivity growth brings expectations of higher future incomes and higher
future profits, so that consumption and investment demand increase. If this
wealth effect is sufficiently strong, then the demand for domestic goods
overwhelms the downward pressure that higher productivity exerts upon the
terms of trade and the real exchange rate appreciates.THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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There are at least three interpretations of the evolution of employment
and productivity growth in the eurozone countries over the last four
decades:
i)  The eurozone has experienced a fall both in the rate of technological
progress and in capital deepening. In fact, investment rates in the
eurozone have been declining in recent decades (see Figure 1.1), so
that gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP was 25.1%,
22.3% and 21.1% in the eurozone and 18.3%, 19.2% and 17.7% in the
US, during the periods 1960-73, 1974-89 and 1990-99, respectively.
And, as discussed in last year’s MPG report, until very recently there
still seemed to be a gap with the respect to the US in the rate of
adoption of the new ICT and in the rate of technological innovation.
(The following section will show that the gap seems to be closing.)
ii) The fall in the rate of growth of productivity recently observed in the
eurozone is what is needed in the transition from a high equilibrium
unemployment rate to a steady state with lower equilibrium
unemployment. Thus, if structural unemployment were receding,
employment growth would accelerate while productivity growth
would decrease in the transition path towards the new balanced
growth path. Moreover, many EU countries need not only to reduce
unemployment but also to increase participation rates and to reduce
the size of the informal sector in order to achieve the employment rate
targets imposed by the so-called ‘Lisbon process’. The entry into
employment of long-term unemployed and groups with marginal
labour market attachments may imply the creation of low-productivity
jobs, which further decrease productivity growth.
iii) The diffusion of a general-purpose technology has generated a
negative trade-off between employment growth and productivity
growth. Beaudry and Collard (2002) show in a standard neo-classical
growth model with exogenous technological progress that the
endogenous adoption of a new technology produces an AK
accumulation phase in which demographic factors are relevant for
productivity growth, so that countries with low (high) population
growth, and, hence, low (high) employment would tend to have low
(high) productivity growth.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Figure 1.1  Gross fixed capital formation as proportion of GDP
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Section 3 of this chapter will analyse hypothesis (i), looking at the
intensity of adoption of IT and summarising the recent evidence on
labour and total factor productivity growth. Section 4 will document the
changing relationship between population growth, employment growth
and productivity growth over the last three decades (1960-1999). Section
5 attempts to discriminate between hypotheses (ii) and (iii), reviewing the
predictions of standard neo-classical growth models (with exogenous and
endogenous technological progress) about the joint dynamics of
population, employment and productivity growth. From this, we draw
some conclusions about the likely evolution of productivity differentials
between the US and the euro area in the medium run.
3.  Is there a relation between IT and productivity in Europe?
Many commentators and observers reckon the extraordinary performance
of the US economy is a result of the superior US position in the
production and adoption of information technologies (IT). About two-
thirds of the US growth resurgence of the second part of the 1990s has
been attributed to the enhanced capital accumulation and the accelerationTHE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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in the pace of technical change enabled by the production and diffusion
of information technologies. A survey conducted by the US Department
of Commerce in October 2001 provides further evidence of how
widespread IT is in the American economy. Two Americans out of three
now use a computer at home, school or work, and the 80% of those who
use a computer are also connected to the Internet. These figures have
quickly grown by several percentage points in the last few years. No
wonder that information technology is regarded as doing magic to
productivity growth.
These comments so far have pertained to the United States. A first-hand
presumption, though, is that as long as IT is the new engine of growth,
the disappointing growth performance of European economies may find
its roots in the delayed diffusion of IT.
Is Europe really lagging behind in terms of IT adoption? Available data
on IT spending and investment – the most readily available measures of
IT adoption from WITSA (2002) – unambiguously show that, as of 2001,
this is no longer the case, at least for Europe as a whole.
As shown in Figure 1.2 IT spending in the EU was two percentage points
smaller in the EU than in the US at the start of the Internet decade. This
gap stayed roughly unchanged until 1998. By 2001, however, the
spending gap was effectively reduced to zero: the EU catching-up in IT
spending started in 1999 and was completed in 2001, when the GDP
shares of IT spending was close to 8% of the respective GDP in both
areas.
The closing of the IT investment gap with the US, depicted in Figure 1.3,
is by contrast a more recent phenomenon, coincident with the sudden
2001 slowdown of IT investment in the US after the 2000 IT capital
overhang. In 1992, IT investment was 1.8% of the EU GDP and 2.4% of
the US GDP. This gap gradually went up to one percentage point in the
first part of the 1990s, and stayed there in 1997-2000, but then declined
to less than half a percentage point in 2001.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Figure 1.2  IT spending/GDP: EU vs. US
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Figure 1.3  IT investment/GDP in the EU vs. the US
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Altogether, these figures imply that Europe’s catching-up in IT diffusion
is much faster than most observers would have anticipated. The persisting
growth gap suffered by the EU as a whole with respect to the US is thus
prima facie not associated with the delayed adoption of information
technologies.
Further details on the relation between IT and growth can also be gauged
from the evidence on the heterogeneous diffusion of information
technologies across the EU countries and how this relates to cross-
country differences in growth rates.
Table 1.1 also shows that, in 1992-2001, IT diffusion was sharply
diversified within Europe. In 1992, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands
and the UK had a GDP share of IT spending comparable to the US. Over
time, other countries, including Finland, France and Germany, but also
Greece and Portugal, significantly accelerated their spending rates in
information technologies. At the end of 2001, combining initial and
subsequently accumulated differences, the EU is clearly polarised in two
groups of countries, the ‘fast’ and the ‘slow IT adopters’. The typical
‘fast IT adopter’ (i.e. Sweden, Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands,
Finland, France, Germany, Belgium and Austria) spends and invests 9%
and 3.7% respectively, of its GDP on IT goods, roughly 50% more than
the typical ‘slow adopter’. The group of the slow adopters includes Italy,
Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland, accounting for about one-third of the
EU’s population.
Did fast and slow adopters, as defined above, enjoy systematically
different growth rates of labour productivity? Table 1.2 reports the period
changes in the growth rates of labour productivity before and after some
time threshold. Looking at changes in growth rates is necessary to net out
country-specific components from productivity growth. The evidence
shows no appreciable difference in the growth performances of the two
groups of countries.THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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Table 1.1 IT spending as a share of GDP
GDP shares, % points Changes in GDP shares, % points
1992 1998 2001 1992-2001 1992-2001 1992-98 1998-2001 2000-01
EU 5.26 5.93 8.20 6.23 + 2.94 + 1.07 + 1.87 + 0.36
SWE 7.34 9.09 11.55 8.63 + 4.21 + 1.75 + 2.46 + 1.16
UK 7.07 7.87 9.79 7.97 + 2.72 + 0.80 + 1.92 + 0.65
NET 6.39 7.76 9.55 7.39 + 3.16 + 1.38 + 1.78 + 0.15
DEN 6.13 7.38 9.52 7.19 + 3.39 + 1.26 + 2.13 + 0.38
FRA 5.71 6.86 9.18 6.75 + 3.47 + 1.15 + 2.32 + 0.52
BEL 5.37 6.60 8.26 6.36 + 2.89 + 1.23 + 1.66 + 0.29
GER 5.26 6.15 8.23 6.07 + 2.97 + 0.90 + 2.07 + 0.37
AUT 4.87 5.66 7.46 5.52 + 2.59 + 0.79 + 1.80 + 0.24
FIN 4.63 6.42 8.01 6.16 + 3.38 + 1.79 + 1.59 + 0.25
IRE 5.38 5.88 6.21 5.80 + 0.83 + 0.51 + 0.32 - 0.45
SPA 3.70 4.11 5.23 4.21 + 1.54 + 0.42 + 1.12 + 0.09
ITA 3.65 4.50 5.86 4.49 + 2.21 + 0.85 + 1.36 + 0.14
POR 2.79 5.00 6.74 4.91 + 3.96 + 2.21 + 1.74 - 0.31
GRE 2.46 5.05 6.30 4.34 + 3.84 + 2.59 + 1.25 + 0.10
US 7.14 7.73 7.96 7.73 + 0.82 + 1.05 - 0.23 - 0.20
Source: Daveri (2002).FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Table 1.2 Change in growth rates of labour productivity (% points)
[1] [2]
∆ growth rate of GDP per employed person
1996-2001 vs. 1990-95 1999-2000 vs. 1992-98
US +1.1 +0.8
EU-15 -0.8 -0.7
Fast IT adopters - 0.29 (st.dev.=0.32) - 0.27 (st.dev.=0.65)
SWE -1.1 -0.8
UK -0.7 -0.4
NET +0.0 -0.1
DEN -0.3 -0.5
FRA +0.4 -0.2
BEL +0.4 -0.3
  GER (*) -0.4 -0.4
AUT +0.4 +0.3
FIN -1.3 +0.0
Slow IT adopters + 0.04 (st.dev.=2.13) + 0.16 (st.dev.=3.03)
IRE +2.7 +1.1
SPA -3.1 -2.5
ITA -1.3 -1.4
POR -1.9 +0.7
GRE +3.8 +2.9
* 1990-95 data for Germany in fact refer to 1992-95.
Note: The group averages for fast and slow IT adopters are arithmetic. The EU
15 average is weighted by each country’s population in each year.
If, in line with the US convention, 1995 is picked as the time threshold
between the early stages and a more mature phase of the Internet, the
(arithmetic) average changes in labour productivity growth are in fact
very close to zero for both groups. Within the slow-adopters group,
Ireland and Greece saw their growth performances sensibly improve over
time. Italy and Spain experienced the reverse. As a result, the group
average change in productivity growth is moderately positive (+0.2%),
but with a high within-group standard deviation (2.1%). The fast adopters
experienced even a slightly negative change in productivity growth in
1996-2001 compared to 1990-95 (-0.3%), with little variability above and
below that figure.THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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The same conclusions are also reached when 1998 is taken as a
benchmark and the changes in productivity growth in 1999-2000 and
1992-98 are looked at. This means that even when the 2001 slowdown is
left out, there is no evidence that productivity growth was accelerating in
either group.
To recap, the aggregate catching-up in IT spending for the EU has had no
counterpart in terms of productivity growth so far. Within Europe, IT
efforts are outright unrelated to any parallel performance in terms of
growth rates. Should one thus infer that there is no link between IT and
productivity in the European Union?
This may be the case for possibly two complementary reasons. IT
investment might be simply unproductive on impact and hence generate
no additional output upfront, when the investment cost is sunk. This
hypothesis has been studied extensively and contrasted with stock market
data to provide a unified rationale of the 1970s productivity slowdown
and the 1990s growth resurgence (see e.g. Greenwood and Jovanovic,
1999). Due to learning effects, the introduction of information
technologies results in extremely high costs of adjustment, with an
adverse effect on the stock market and productivity growth for some time
until the new invention has been absorbed. This is a potentially useful
hypothesis for Europe as well. It is unfortunately still hard to evaluate, for
the upsurge in IT spending in the EU is too recent.
The second possibility is that IT investment and spending does produce
positive growth effects, but other factors more than offset its beneficial
effects.
This conjecture can be evaluated in Table 1.3, where the changes in the
growth contributions from IT capital (per hour worked) and TFP growth
between the first and the second half of the 1990s are reported. The
methodology of construction of growth contributions and TFP growth
follows standard growth accounting practices. Both methods and data
description are described in detail in Daveri (2001). Looking at both the
growth contributions from IT as well as TFP growth is worthwhile, for
information technologies may positively affect the growth rate of labour
productivity through both channels (capital deepening and TFP).FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Table 1.3 Change in growth contributions and in TFP growth (% points)
[1] [2]
∆ growth contribution of
IT capital per man hour
∆ TFP growth
1996-99 vs. 1991-95 1996-99 vs. 1991-95
Fast IT adopters +0.13 (st.dev.=0.27) -0.17 (st.dev.=1.39)
SWE 0.33 -0.8
UK 0.68 -0.4
NET -0.08 -0.1
DEN 0.14 -0.5
FRA -0.02 -0.2
BEL -0.07 -0.3
  GER (*) -0.14 -0.4
AUT 0.04 +0.3
FIN 0.32 +0.0
Slow IT-adopters +0.09 (st.dev.=0.20) + 0.14 (st.dev.=1.55)
IRE 0.35 +1.1
SPA -0.18 -2.5
ITA -0.01 -1.4
POR 0.07 +0.7
GRE 0.21 +2.9
* 1990-95 data for Germany in fact refer to 1992-95.
While the actual size of the growth effects of IT in Europe is still
surrounded by large measurement error, the overall picture from the
available aggregate data is not. It is as follows:
1)  The marginal growth contribution of IT capital (the ‘capital
deepening’ effect) to the acceleration of labour productivity growth is
low on average (about a tenth of a percentage point). It is slightly
higher for the fast adopters than for the slow adopters (0.13 p.p.
against 0.09). In both cases, it is much smaller than in the US, where
it was about 0.5 p.p. (see Table 2 in Oliner and Sichel, 2000).
2)  There are exceptions, however. The most notable one is the UK,
where the additional IT growth contribution amounts to about two-
thirds of a percentage point. This has not materialised in higher
labour productivity growth mainly for the parallel decline in TFP
growth experienced in the United Kingdom between the first and the
second halves of the 1990s.THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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3)  Sweden and Finland also cashed a positive additional growth
contribution of about 0.3 percentage points from IT capital. This was
more than offset by the decline in TFP growth in Sweden and by the
(not reported) decline in the contribution of non-IT capital in Finland.
4)  In Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Greece, the positive contributions
from IT capital have been supplemented by increases in TFP growth.
In spite of their limited IT investment shares, both countries benefited
from comparatively high rates of return on investment (about 4.5% in
real terms in the second half of the 1990s). In Ireland, this was clearly
related to the presence of IT multinational corporations.
5)  The other large EU countries experienced, one way or another,
negative additional growth contributions from capital deepening and
TFP growth. This effect was moderate in Germany, France,
Denmark, Belgium and Denmark. It was more dramatic in Italy and
Spain, where IT capital deepening did not take off and average TFP
growth actually slowed down considerably by 1.4% and 2.5%,
respectively, in 1996-99.
To sum up, it is certainly not yet appropriate to think of the EU
economies as new economies. In general, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that, despite the catching-up in IT diffusion experienced by
most EU countries in recent years, information technologies have so far
delivered little aggregate productivity gains in Europe. This is the
productivity paradox for Europe. For countries in northern Europe, IT
spending and investment are not much different from that of the United
States. But even if the investment flow has reached the US size, the stock
of installed IT may still be too low to gain from the network economies.
In order to gauge whether IT will lead Europe to a similar economic
growth as happened in the US, we need to understand why productivity
growth has lagged behind the US and which factors have hampered
growth in these countries so far. And which are the factors that – in
contrast to southern European states – eventually led to IT adoption? If,
as we argued in last year's report, labour market reform has not really
progressed across the board in Europe, why has IT adoption progressed
so much at least in some European countries.
The European Commission (2002) in its report on European
competitiveness cites studies attributing a large part of the US
productivity gains to the service sector. One reason for the differences in
IT investment flows across Europe may be the different composition of
the services sectors across Europe (business and financial services in the
north versus hotels and restaurants in the south?).FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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But a more important factor might derive from the fact that the internal
market for services is not yet completed. This implies that there are still
separated national markets, whose dynamic might evolve differently
depending on national regulatory regimes. Nicoletti (2001) groups
countries along how liberal an approach to industry regulation they
pursue. To the ‘very liberal’ cluster belong the US and in Europe,
Sweden and the UK; to the ‘mostly liberal’ cluster belong Germany,
Netherlands, Finland and also Ireland; in the medium liberal cluster are
Denmark and Belgium; and a restrictive industrial policy is pursued by
the remaining countries, in particular Italy and Greece. The slow IT
adopters are seldom found among the keener deregulators. Slow IT
adoption might to some extend constitute a reflection of a particular
country's general unwillingness to reform.
For a full picture it would be necessary to take a more microeconomic
look at IT adoption across Europe. On the supply side, which are the
labour market institutions in particular – given their variety across Europe
– that pose an impediment to structural change? On the demand side,
which is the competitive environment of industries that use IT
intensively?
This is beyond the scope of this report. In the following sections, we will
retain our macroeconomic focus and analyse a macro-development that
may also explain differences in productivity – abstracting from the
microeconomics of labour market reform and deregulation. Differences in
employment growth may in itself be sufficient to cause differences in
productivity.
4.  Population, employment and productivity growth: The facts
We now turn to a discussion of the second hypothesis concerning the
productivity slowdown in Europe, namely that it could represent a
welcome development. The core of this hypothesis is that labour markets
now work better in Europe, allowing workers with lower productivity to
also find a job. While these workers are coming into the work force, they
mathematically lower measured productivity growth. What is the factual
basis for this argument?THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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Table 1.4 reports the average annual growth rates of total population,
working-age population (population aged 15-64), total labour force,
employment, GDP, labour productivity and technological progress
(measured by the ratio of total factor productivity to the wage share) over
the last four decades of the 20
th century.
3 We distinguish four periods, the
years up to the first oil crisis (1960-73), the years of recessions after the
negative oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s and the subsequent recovery
(1974-89), the 1990s, the years in which the introduction of new
information and communication technologies led some pundits to believe
in the existence of a ‘new economy’, and the second half of the 1990s,
the period during which the contrast between the productivity
performance of the eurozone and of the US has been the most striking.
During the first period (1960-73), population growth was slightly higher
than in 1974-99. Working-age population, labour force and employment
grew at roughly the same rates, as participation and unemployment rates
were more or less constant.
4 In European countries, the rates of growth of
labour productivity and technological progress were roughly similar,
which suggests that these countries were close to a steady-state growth
path. By contrast, in the US, the rate of growth of technological progress,
which was lower than in Europe, was higher than productivity growth.
5
The second period (1974-89) is characterised by the employment crisis in
Europe. Despite declining participation rates, employment grew much
less than the labour force. In this regard the comparison with the US is
remarkable: whereas the rates of growth of the labour force and of
employment were around 2% per annum in the latter, the rate of growth
of the labour force averaged 0.7% per annum in the current members of
the eurozone while employment grew at the very low rate of 0.3% per
annum. This happened with working-age population growth rates of 1.2%
and 0.8% per annum, in the US and in the eurozone, respectively. The
evolution of productivity is also dramatically different in the two zones.
                                                          
3 Data for population come from the World Bank’s Global Development
Network Growth Database (available at www.worldbank.org/research/growth/).
Data on the wage share come from EUROSTAT’s Statistical Appendix to the
European Economy. The rest of the series are from OECD databases.
4 There are however some exceptions. In southern Europe, participation rates
fell, mostly because young cohorts started to delay entrance into the labour
market, remaining for a longer period in education. By contrast, US participation
rates increased, accounted for mostly by increasing female participation rates.
5 This also happened in Canada, Portugal, Spain, Japan and Norway. The average
rate of technological progress for the eurozone is a GDP-weighted average.THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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Table 1.4 Rates of growth of population, labour force, employment, GDP and productivity
               (average annual rates in percentage points)
1960-73 1974-89 1990-99 1995-99 1960-73 1974-89 1990-99 1995-99
Eurozone average
Population 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 GDP 5.5 2.6 2.5 2.4
Working-age population 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 Labour productivity 5.1 2.3 1.7 1.4
Labour force 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 Technological progress 5.5 2.2 1.5 1.3
Employment 0.4 0.3 0.8 1.0
United Kingdom
Population 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 GDP 3.3 1.9 2.1 2.8
Working-age population 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 Labour productivity 3.0 1.5 1.9 1.3
Labour force 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.6 Technological progress 3.2 1.6 2.1 1.6
Employment 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.4
US
Population 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 GDP 4.4 3.0 3.0 3.8
Working-age population 1.7 1.2 1.0 1.1 Labour productivity 2.5 1.0 1.8 2.2
Labour force 1.9 2.0 1.1 1.2 Technological progress 3.0 1.1 2.0 2.6
Employment 1.9 2.0 1.2 1.6
Japan
Population 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.3 GDP 9.4 3.9 1.7 1.3
Working-age population 1.6 0.9 0.1 -0.1 Labour productivity 8.1 3.2 1.2 1.2
Labour force 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.6 Technological progress 8.9 2.6 0.2 0.4
Employment 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.6THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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These are the years of the so-called ‘productivity slowdown’ in the US, where
labour productivity and technological progress grew at a meagre 1.1% per
annum, while the current member countries of the eurozone were enjoying
average growth rates above 2%.
We finally come to the third period (1990-99) in which, again, there is some
contrast between continental Europe and the US. While in the US,
employment and labour force continued growing at similar rates, keeping
medium-run unemployment roughly constant, in the eurozone employment
and labour force growth increased to surpass working-age population, so that
participation rates increased while the average unemployment rate remained
more or less constant.
6 Thus, the employment rate in these countries was more
than double the employment growth observed during the previous period
(0.8% versus 0.3%), in contrast with the US in which employment and labour
force growth fell with respect to the 1974-89 period. In the eurozone,
however, the acceleration of employment was accompanied by a deceleration
of productivity, whereas the contrary happened in the US where productivity
growth surged to double the average rates of the 1974-89 period.
Table 1.5 Employment, productivity and working-age population:
Regression results
Coefficient Standard error
Dependent variable: Employment growth
1960-73 0.73 0.08
1974-89 0.14 0.15
1990-99 1.25 0.30
Dependent variable: Labour productivity growth
1960-73 -0.62 0.20
1974-89 -0.48 0.21
1990-99 0.00 0.27
Dependent variable: Rate of growth of technological progress
1960-73 -0.57 0.25
1974-89 -0.67 0.29
1990-99 0.25 0.42
Note:  The sample is composed of the 19 countries presented in Table
A.1 in the Annex of this chapter. Independent variables are a
constant and the rate of growth of working-age population, whose
coefficient and its standard error is reported in the table.
                                                          
6 The average unemployment rate in the eurozone increased over the first half of the
1990s to decrease in the second half, as was shown in last year’s report. The rise of
participation was mostly noticeable for women.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Thus, over the periods considered above, there are significant changes in the
joint evolution of demographic, labour market and productivity variables. A
simple regression of the productivity variables (labour productivity and
technological progress) on working-age population gives results reported in
Table 1.5. While in the three decades up to the 1990s there was a negative
correlation between labour productivity growth and working-age population
growth, on the one hand, and between the rate of growth of technological
progress and working-age population growth, on the other, during the last
decade this correlation has vanished. The reason has to be found in the
evolution of employment. During the 1960-73 period, working-age population
and employment grew at the same rate so that, since employment and
productivity are negatively correlated (as it should be along a downward
sloping labour demand curve), the latter and working-age population growth
were also negatively correlated. During the 1974-89 period, despite the fact
that employment grew at a lower rate than working-age population in most
countries, with very little correlation between both variables, it remained a
negative correlation between productivity growth (both labour productivity
growth and the rate of technological progress) and working-age population
growth. It is worth noting that when employment and working-age population
began to grow again at similar rates throughout the 1990s, as happened in the
1960-1973 period, the correlation between productivity growth and working-
age population growth seems to be null. In other words, countries
experiencing relatively high employment growth had relatively low
productivity growth and also relatively low rates of growth of technological
progress (see Figures. 1.4-1.7). This is what Beaudry and Collard (2002) call
the ‘strong employment-productivity trade-off’.
5.  The sources of potential output growth
Under the standard neo-classical growth model with exogenous technological
change, potential output growth is independent of the rate of growth of the
working-age population, so that in the balanced growth path the employment
rate is constant (employment grows at the same rate as working-age
population) and labour productivity growth is determined only by the rate of
technological progress. Hence, any correlation between employment growth
and labour productivity growth only arises in the transitional dynamics
towards the steady state. Within this framework, a rising (falling) employment
rate would lead to acceleration (deceleration) of the labour input that would
lower (increase) the capital-labour ratio in steady state. In the transition to the
new steady state, labour-productivity growth falls (increases) below (above)
the rate of technological progress to converge to the new balanced growth path
with the same rate of labour productivity and GDP per capita as in the
previous one. Thus, the strong employment productivity trade-off is aTHE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
21
transitory phenomenon that vanishes in the long term, namely, in the period of
time that it takes to converge to a new balanced growth path.
A negative correlation between productivity growth and employment growth
can also be rationalised by an endogenous growth model with constant returns
to capital in which the rate of growth of output per worker is negatively
correlated with employment growth across countries. This situation arises
when the elasticity of production with respect to capital increases but firms
can choose the mix of the two technologies, the old one with a low elasticity
of production with respect to capital and the new one with the higher elasticity
(see Beaudry and Collard, 2002). The adoption of the new technology takes
place gradually when the initial capital intensity (capital-to-labour ratio in
efficiency units) is above a certain threshold, but it is not high enough. During
this gradual adoption phase, productivity growth will be lower in countries
with higher employment growth. Once the adoption of the new technology is
completed and the economy converges to a new balanced growth path,
aggregate labour productivity will rise at the rate of technological progress,
while employment growth will be determined by working-age population
growth. In any event, within this framework the negative correlation between
labour productivity growth and employment growth is, as in the standard neo-
classical framework, a negative phenomenon that will end when the adoption
of the new technology is completed.
Neither of the hypothesis (ii) and (iii), mentioned in the introduction to this
chapter, explains, however, the overall evolution characterised by the evidence
reported in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. The first interpretation of the deceleration of
productivity in the eurozone in the 1990s seems however inconsistent with the
evolution of GDP growth and investment and with the lack of fundamental
reforms in the labour market. If these countries had embarked on a transition
path towards a steady state with higher equilibrium employment, we would
have observed a rise of GDP growth. As seen in Figure 1.8, however, while
the rate of growth of investment remained more or less constant through the
1974-89 and 1990-99 periods, GDP growth decreased by 0.1 percentage
points. This suggests that the fall in productivity growth is due to something
other than the dynamics of a new balanced growth path with lower structural
unemployment.
The lack of fundamental reforms was an issue that we discussed at some
length in last year’s MPG report. In our view, the recent experience of labour
market reforms in EU countries shows that institutional changes are often
marginal and, in too many occasions, contradictory. The attempts to
coordinate a common approach aimed at improving the functioning of the
labour market are not delivering so far. Employment policies came to the top
of the EU political agenda after the Amsterdam Treaty, which launched a
coordinated European Employment Strategy to fight unemployment. TheFISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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European Council agreed in the Luxembourg Jobs Summit in November 1997
that this strategy should be built on thematic priorities, grouped in four pillars
and described in employment guidelines. The four pillars (improving
employability, developing entrepreneurship, encouraging adaptability of
business and their employees, and strengthening the policies for equal
opportunities) are theoretically sound, but, in practice, they have not led to the
needed fundamental changes in employment policies. If anything, they have
been a good alibi for increasing active labour market policies whose
effectiveness in reducing unemployment is open to question.
Moreover, both of the interpretations (ii) and (iii) of the deceleration in
productivity sketched in the introduction to this chapter rely upon the
existence of an exogenous process for labour efficiency, so that the rate of
technological progress is independent of labour market and demographic
variables and also of changes in parameters characterising technologies (such
as the elasticity of production with respect to capital). But, as shown in Table
1.4, the rate of technological progress has fallen in the eurozone, while it has
increased in the US in the 1990-99 period vis-à-vis the 1974-89 period. And,
as shown in Table 1.5, not only did the correlation across countries between
labour productivity and working-age population growth, which was negative
during the 1960-89 period, prove to be statistically insignificant only during
the last decade. Something similar also happened regarding the correlation
between the rate of technological progress and working-age population.
Thus, a more worrisome interpretation is that what we are observing is not
totally due to transitional dynamics of new balanced growth paths with similar
rates of technological progress across countries, either with exogenous or
endogenous technological change. It may also be that the rates of
technological progress are diverging: increasing in the US while decreasing in
the eurozone. In this case, output potential growth will decrease in the
eurozone while the euro will tend to depreciate against the dollar if there is not
a compensating (negative) inflation differential in the eurozone with respect to
the US. Will the increasing adoption of IT technologies in Europe be able to
reverse this depreciation? Given the uneven speed of adoption and our
reflections on the premises on economic reform that is necessary to reap the
full benefits of IT investment, we remain sceptical that we will witness such a
reversal any time soon.THE BIG PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN IN EUROPE
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Figure 1.4 Labour productivity growth and employment growth by period
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Figure 1.6 Labour productivity growth and employment growth by country
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Figure 1.7 The rate of growth of technological progress and employment
growth by country
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Figure 1.8 GDP growth and gross fixed capital formation
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STATISTICAL ANNEX TO CHAPTER 1
Table A1.1  Rates of growth of population, labour force, employment, GDP and productivity in the euro area
(average annual rates in percentage points), by country
1960-73 1974-89 1990-99 1995-99 1960-73 1974-89 1990-99 1995-99
Austria
Population 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.1 GDP 4.8 2.4 2.3 2.0
Working-age population 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.2 Labour productivity 4.9 2.3 1.9 1.6
Labour force -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 Technological progress 5.0 2.1 1.7 º.4
Employment 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.4
Belgium
Population 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 GDP 4.9 2.1 2.2 2.3
Working-age population 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 Labour productivity 4.5 2.1 1.9 1.4
Labour force 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 Technological progress 4.9 1.9 1.8 1.4
Employment 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.9
Finland
Population 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 GDP 4.9 3.0 1.9 4.7
Working-age population 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 Labour productivity 4.4 2.6 2.9 2.4
Labour force 0.5 0.4 -0.3 0.6 Technological progress 4.4 2.6 3.9 6.0
Employment 0.5 0.4 -1.0 2.2
France
Population 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 GDP 5.4 2.5 1.8 2.3
Working-age population 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.4 Labour productivity 4.7 2.2 1.4 1.5
Labour force 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6  Technological progress 5.1 2.1 1.3 1.8
Employment 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.927
Germany
Population 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.1 GDP 4.4 2.1 2.0 1.4
Working-age population 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.1 Labour productivity 4.1 1.9 1.7 1.1
Labour force 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 Technological progress 3.8 1.9 1.6 0.8
Employment 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3
Greece
Population 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.2 GDP 8.6 1.6 1.9 2.8
Working-age population 0.3 1.0 0.6 0.2 Labour productivity 9.1 0.7 1.3 2.2
Labour force -0.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 Technological progress 9.2 -0.3 1.0 2.3
Employment -0.5 0.9 0.6 0.6
Ireland
Population 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.9 GDP 4.2 2.9 6.2 8.0
Working-age population 0.5 1.2 1.5 1.8 Labour productivity 4.1 2.7 2.6 2.4
Labour force 0.1 0.7 2.6 3.6 Technological progress 3.9 2.3 4.5 5.1
Employment 0.1 0.1 3.7 5.6
Italy
Population 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 GDP 5.3 2.8 1.5 2.1
Working-age population 0.4 0.6 0.1 -0.1 Labour productivity 5.5 2.0 1.4 1.5
Labour force -0.2 1.0 0.3 0.6 Technological progress 5.6 1.9 1.2 1.7
Employment -0.2 0.8 0.2 0.6
The Netherlands
Population 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.5 GDP 4.8 2.1 3.0 3.4
Working-age population 1.5 1.2 0.5 0.4 Labour productivity 3.3 1.3 1.0 0.8
Labour force 1.6 1.2 1.6 1.7 Technological progress 3.2 1.2 1.6 1.528
Employment 1.5 0.9 1.9 2.5
Portugal
Population -0.3 0.9 0.1 0.2 GDP 7.0 3.0 2.7 3.2
Working-age population -0.2 1.3 0.4 0.3 Labour productivity 6.7 3.1 2.8 3.3
Labour force 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 Technological progress 7.7 3.0 2.6 3.1
Employment 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Spain
Population 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 GDP 7.2 2.6 2.4 3.5
Working-age population 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.2 Labour productivity 6.5 2.8 1.2 0.8
Labour force 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.8 Technological progress 7.5 2.5 0.7 0.9
Employment 0.7 -0.3 1.3 2.629
Table A1.2  Rates of growth of population, labour force, employment GDP and productivity, eurozone average and in
other selected countries (average annual rates in percentage points)
1960-73 1974-89 1990-99 1995-99 1960-73 1974-89 1990-99 1995-99
Eurozone average
Population 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 GDP 5.5 2.6 2.5 2.4
Working-age population 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.2 Labour productivity 5.1 2.3 1.7 1.4
Labour force 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 Technological progress 5.5 2.2 1.5 1.3
Employment 0.4 0.3 0.8 1.0
Sweden
Population 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2 GDP 4.1 1.8 1.7 3.3
Working-age population 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 Labour productivity 3.6 0.9 2.5 2.6
Labour force 0.6 0.8 -0.2 0.2 Technological progress 3.7 0.8 3.0 3.9
Employment 0.6 0.8 -0.8 0.7
United Kingdom
Population 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 GDP 3.3 1.9 2.1 2.8
Working-age population 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 Labour productivity 3.0 1.5 1.9 1.3
Labour force 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.6 Technological progress 3.2 1.6 2.1 1.6
Employment 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.4
US
Population 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 GDP 4.4 3.0 3.0 3.8
Working-age population 1.7 1.2 1.0 1.1 Labour productivity 2.5 1.0 1.8 2.2
Labour force 1.9 2.0 1.1 1.2 Technological progress 3.0 1.1 2.0 2.6
Employment 1.9 2.0 1.2 1.630
Canada
Population 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.0 GDP 5.3 3.2 2.3 3.4
Working-age population 2.5 1.6 1.1 1.1 Labour productivity 2.5 0.6 1.1 1.4
Labour force 2.7 2.7 1.2 1.4 Technological progress 3.5 0.4 1.1 1.8
Employment 2.8 2.6 1.2 2.1
Denmark
Population 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 GDP 4.4 1.3 2.4 2.9
Working-age population 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 Labour productivity 3.4 1.0 2.2 1.8
Labour force 1.0 0.7 -0.1 0.5 Technological progress 3.5 0.8 2.8 2.4
Employment 1.1 0.2 0.2 1.1
Japan
Population 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.3 GDP 9.4 3.9 1.7 1.3
Working-age population 1.6 0.9 0.1 -0.1 Labour productivity 8.1 3.2 1.2 1.2
Labour force 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.6 Technological progress 8.9 2.6 0.2 0.4
Employment 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.6
Norway
Population 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 GDP 4.3 3.4 3.5 3.4
Working-age population 1.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 Labour productivity 3.5 2.0 2.5 1.4
Labour force 0.7 1.6 0.7 1.4 Technological progress 2.9 1.5 4.3 2.7
Employment 0.7 1.3 1.0 2.031
CHAPTER 2
AN ASSESSMENT OF ECB POLICY
his chapter turns to the analysis of monetary policy in the euro
area. Section 1 provides a brief review of all policy decisions
taken by the ECB Council since publication of the previous
MPG report in June 2001. Section 2 employs several indicators
to assess the degree of looseness of monetary conditions in the period
under review. Section 3 addresses the question of whether the ECB
systematically follows the US Federal Reserve and concludes that 2001
was the year of the de-coupling. Section 4 evaluates the ECB’s monetary
policy strategy as well as its communications policy. Section 5 evaluates
the appropriateness of 2% as the upper limit of the ECB’s definition of
price stability.
1. Monetary policy decisions
June/July 2001
It was decided to make no changes to policy rates at the June and July
2001 meetings. The ECB noted the gradual increase in M3 growth, but
felt that it was still close to the reference value once distortions were
taken into account. This judgement was further supported by the
deceleration of credit to the private sector. As regards the other factors
affecting inflation, the slowdown in GDP growth was expected to
‘…contribute to a dampening upward pressure on consumer prices’,
7
although there were risks that the decline in inflationary pressures could
be…overshadowed by short-term increases in inflation [related] mainly
to oil prices and the impact of animal diseases on food prices’. In public
statements, it was emphasised that the ECB was following a ‘wait-and-
see’ approach.
30 August 2001
At its meeting on the 30th of August, ‘…the Governing Council decided
to lower the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points’ to 4.25% as
largely anticipated by market participants (see below). The decision was
made notwithstanding the acceleration of M3 to 5.9%, which was viewed
as transitory and attributable to a change in liquidity preferences. With
                                                
7 This and all other material quoted in this section has been taken from the ECB
website.
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regards to the second pillar, ‘…there were clear signals of lower
inflationary pressures from the demand side.’ Concerns were expressed
about the ‘…emergence of second-round effects, via wages, of past
increases in consumer price inflation’ and ‘…the impact that slower
growth might have on the determination of the governments of some
countries to adhere strictly to the Stability and Growth Pact’, given that
‘…short-term discretionary measures aimed at strengthening demand
risked having an unwelcome impact on the economy’ and ‘undermined
the credibility of the consolidation process’.
17 September 2001
‘Following the terrorist attacks on the US, uncertainty about the US and
the world economy has increased. The Federal Open Market Committee
has reacted by lowering its target for the federal funds rate. In concert
with this decision, the Governing Council of the ECB [decided to] reduce
the minimum bid rate on main refinancing operations of the
Eurosystem…by 0.50 pp to 3.75%.’ The 50 bp cut demonstrated
unambiguously that the ECB can act promptly and decisively if needed.
The rate cut announcement, however, occurred only 30 minutes after the
weekly tender announcement stating that rates would remain at 4.25%,
rekindling the arguments about the effectiveness of the ECB’s
communications policy.
8 November 2001
After the Council ‘…chose to keep their powder dry’ in the October
meetings, at its meeting on the 8th of November, ‘…the Governing
Council decided to lower key interest rates by 50 basis points’ to 3.25%.
‘In assessing the information which had accumulated over the past few
weeks, [they] concluded that inflationary pressures had further
diminished.’ The decision to cut rates had de facto to be based on the
second pillar given that M3 accelerated further, but this was viewed as
‘…a reflection of an increased liquidity preference by investors in an
environment of a relatively flat yield curve’. There were ‘…much clearer
signals of a further reduction of inflationary pressures from the demand
side’ but, once again, concern was expressed that countries might fall
short on their fiscal commitments under the Growth and Stability Pact.
The decision to cut interest rates by 50 bp rather than by 25 was clearly at
odds with public comments made by some members of the Council prior
to the meeting. When questioned about that seeming inconsistency in the
press conference, Wim Duisenberg explicitly responded that ‘it is him
market participants should listen to’. The point was further emphasised inAN ASSESSMENT OF ECB POLICY
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the hearing before the Monetary and Financial Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament in December. It shows that the ECB Council came
eventually to accept that too many public pronouncements by Council
members hinder an effective communications policy. Since that time one
can detect more discipline and coordination in statements by Council
members. A further element of improvement in the ECB’s
communications was the decision that from December onwards,
monetary policy issues would only be discussed at the first meeting of
every month, thereby avoiding speculation on possible changes in
policies to take place every fortnight.
7 March 2002
At its meeting on the 7th of March, the ECB chose to keep interest rates
unchanged at 3.25% and, effectively, signalled the end of the easing
cycle. In the press conference, Duisenberg stated that ‘…the trough in
real economic conditions [had been] reached around the end of last year
and the beginning of this year’, and that ‘the economy had started its way
back to recovery.’ The usual homage was paid to the first pillar,
reiterating that it would only signal risks to price stability if fast money
growth were to continue even when the recovery gains momentum.
‘…Some normalisation in the development of M3’, however, could only
be noted in the April meeting (although M3 growth was still more than 3
percentage point above its reference value).
2. The reaction of monetary policy to the downturn in activity
During 2001, monetary policy had to deal with a combination of a sudden
deceleration in demand and a continuation of inflationary pressures. This
already-difficult environment was compounded by the shock waves that
rocked financial markets after the September 11
th terrorist attacks on the
US. The purpose of this section is essentially to describe and to analyse
how the ECB reacted to these difficult circumstances. Three types of
standard indicators are used in this section: monetary and credit
aggregates, short-term real interest rates and monetary conditions indices
(MCI), which directly take into account exchange rate movements.
Money growth
During the period under review, the measurement of M3 underwent the
second stage of the methodological change designed to ensure that all
money holdings of non-euro area residents were excluded from the
aggregate in line with the definition of money chosen by the ECB.
Following the exclusion in May 2001 of money-market fund shares andFISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
34
units held by non-residents, in October 2001 non-residents’ holdings of
money market paper and short-term securities with an initial maturity of
up to two years were also excluded.
Even though the exclusion of non-residents’ monetary assets led to a
lower measure of M3 growth, M3 accelerated strongly and reached a
peak of 8.1% in December. Since then it has slowed, but it remains well
above the threshold level of 4.5% (confirmed at the annual review by the
ECB Council in December). The acceleration in M3 reflected the
increased liquidity preference in an environment of considerable
uncertainty (even before the terrorist attacks), weak performance by stock
markets and the flattening of the yield curve that reduced the opportunity
cost of holding money. Indirect evidence on the size of the portfolio shifts
underpinning the acceleration in M3 is given by the dramatic rise in the
rate of growth of marketable instruments – the type of assets that is the
first choice in the case of portfolio shifts away from more risky and less
liquid assets, even when spending decisions are not planned. As shown in
the chart below, marketable instruments held by residents provided a
sizeable contribution to M3 growth, as can be appreciated by the
difference between M3 and M2 (on average 0.9% in the first half of 2001
and 1.7% in the second part), which is accounted for by this type of
monetary asset.
As the acceleration in M3 growth could be traced to increases in liquidity
preference, fast money growth was not worrying from an inflation point
of view – an interpretation that was supported by developments in credit
aggregates, and most notably credit to the private sector, which
decelerated throughout the period.
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The shift in liquidity preference that took place in the period under
review considerably impairs the reliability of money aggregates in
conveying information about current economic developments. However,
the ample liquidity conditions and the fact that credit growth, although
slowing down, has consistently remained above nominal GDP growth do
not point to the risk of monetary policy as being grossly insufficient to
counteract the slowdown. Was it too generous? Other indicators of the
monetary stance and developments in inflation can provide elements to
answer this question.
The short-term real interest rate
As usual, the assessment of the monetary stance based on short-term real
interest rates depends critically on the inflation rate used for the deflation.
We consider here headline inflation, core inflation and the break-even
inflation from the inflation-linker OAT issued by the French Treasury.
We then compare the resulting rates with output growth. As the chart
shows, according to this type of indicator the monetary stance was eased
substantially – indeed more so than in the 1998-99 slowdown, for the
measures were based on actual as opposed to break-even inflation. The
easing was quite rapid and, when scaled for the size of the slowdown, of
a magnitude that does not lend support to the critique, levied in some
quarters, that the ECB action has been too timid and slow, particularly
when compared to the Federal Reserve. Moreover, as the analysis below
shows, not even the view that the ECB followed the Fed finds support
from the data. 2002 can be regarded as the year of the de-coupling of the
monetary policies of the Fed and the ECB.
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Figure 2.3  Euroland output growth and real interest rates
It has to be noted that a non-negligible part of the easing of monetary
conditions in the euro area has came from the rise in the rate of inflation,
rather than from the decline in nominal rates. In a way, the aftermath of
the oil shock on inflation did a good part of the work for the ECB, thus
limiting the scope for further reductions in nominal interest rates.
Figure 2.4  US output growth and real interest rates
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Market participants shared with the ECB the view that the increase in
inflation would be in large part temporary, as shown by the developments
in the break-even inflation. This is at one time a very powerful indicator
of the credibility of the ECB and a reminder that the extent of the easing
of monetary conditions may be overestimated by the conventional
measures of short-term real interest rates.
Monetary conditions index
The monetary conditions index (MCI) is usually used as a tool of
monetary analysis in small open economies. However, the movements in
the euro since its introduction have been so pronounced that the exchange
rate has had a significant effect on monetary conditions, even in a
relatively closed economy such as the euro area taken as a whole. The
MCI can thus provide a useful contribution to the analysis of monetary
conditions. Moreover, as shown in last year’s report (Gros et al., 2001,
pp. 92-98), qualitative indications from the MCI for the euro area tend to
be robust to alternative choices regarding the selection of the interest rate
used in the MCI and the weight of the exchange rate component within a
range reasonable for an economy as closed as the US.
An inspection of the recent developments in the MCI reveals two key
findings:
1.  The easing of monetary conditions that took place in the period under
review is mainly due to movements in the interest rate; the extent of
easing in any event is smaller than that which followed the inception
of EMU as a result of the depreciation of the euro.
Figure 2.5  Euroland real refi rate
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2.  The decline in the MCI was more marked for the real than for the
nominal index, further emphasising the point that a non-negligible
part of the easing of monetary conditions was due to a fall in real
rates brought about by the rise in inflation.
When considering this indicator, an important caveat has to be borne in
mind. Movements in the exchange rate can be thought to have a direct
link with demand conditions only in so far as the equilibrium exchange
rate (EER) is taken to remain constant. Notwithstanding the well known
problems in trying to proxy the unobservable EER, the standard usage of
MCI indicators hinges on the premise that the EER is a slow-moving
variable, whose variations at the business-cycle frequency are negligible.
This hypothesis, however, may not be warranted for the euro area in the
period since the introduction of the euro. This point can be vividly
illustrated by comparing actual developments in the interest rate with
those of two implicit interest rates. The latter can be defined as the
interest rate that would have produced the actual monetary stance if the
exchange rate of the euro had remained constant at its January 1999 and
January 2002 levels, respectively.
The chart shows that if the euro had remained at the average level in
January 1999, the same monetary conditions that actually prevailed
would have required short-term interest rates at below 3% for the past
two years. It is equally evident that the difference between the actual and
implied rates has remained constant since the beginning of 2001, which
confirms that changes in monetary conditions have been mainly driven by
interest rate movements in the last 12 months.
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Figure 2.7  Euroland implicit interest rates for constant EER
When plotted against the quarter-on-quarter annualised rate of output
growth, the MCI confirms that monetary conditions eased significantly in
response to the slowdown and that the easing is more marked when the
effect of inflation on real rates is taken into account. Once again, this
indicator offers no support for the case against the ECB for being too
slow and timid to react to the slowdown in aggregate demand. Whether
the easing led liquidity conditions to an appropriate or a far too
expansionary level is, as argued above, essentially contingent on an
unavoidable judgement of whether the EER of the euro has changed since
1999.
Figure 2.8  Euroland output growth and monetary conditions
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There are several elements that support the notion that a non-negligible
part of the depreciation of the euro reflects a change in the EER:
•  the widening of the productivity differential in favour of the US
documented in Chapter 1 of this report,
•  a far smaller pass-through of the depreciation to domestic
inflation than historical experience would have suggested, and
•  the rather limited increase in the euro area trade surplus despite
the substantial real depreciation.
If the equilibrium real exchange rate has indeed depreciated, one could
argue that the easing in monetary conditions as signalled by the MCI has
been less generous than might appear.
Why has the fall in inflation been so slow?
The indicators discussed so far unambiguously point to an easing of
monetary conditions in response to the weakening of growth and the
perceived risk that, after the terrorist attack, the slowdown in the global
economy could really turn into a major recession. Against the background
of such weak demand conditions, it is quite remarkable that inflation has
declined so slowly, surprising everybody with its persistence, particularly
as regards core inflation.
Indeed, die-hard monetarists could argue that the persistence of both
headline and core inflation at high levels is not that surprising in the light
of the acceleration of M3. Were developments in M3 sending signals
about inflationary pressures which should have received more attention?
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Unfortunately for monetarists and for the role of the first pillar of the
monetary policy strategy of the ECB, this prima facie association does
not withstand even a slightly closer scrutiny. The fact that the
acceleration in M3 is following rather than preceding (with the typical lag
of at least 6 and possibly as long as 18 months) the spike in inflation
seems, in the event, to deprive money growth and the pairing of policy
rates of a direct (or even indirect but traceable) connection with the rise in
inflation.
8
Why then has inflation been surprising everybody on the high side? Part
of the explanation is certainly due to a succession of shocks to food prices
and the renewed increase in the oil prices sparked by the escalating
conflict in Palestine. The former provided a contribution to the overall
headline inflation of a full percentage point, even though food makes up
only 16% of the basket. The rise in food price inflation
9 has involved
processed and unprocessed food alike and has been unexpectedly
persistent.
                                                
8 Moreover, even a simplistic Granger causality analysis (conducted within the
framework of a variety of VAR) fails to uncover even a minimal hint that money
growth may have Granger caused inflation in the episode at hand.
9 The three well known shocks that have taken place in the last 12 months are:
BSE, which started in early 2001 but recurred at various times, foot-and-mouth
disease (May 2001) and a spell of unusually cold weather in January 2002. The
effect of these shocks, at least so far, has been surprisingly persistent compared
to similar situations in the past.
Figure 2.10  Contribution of food to headline inflation
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Yet, in spite of its persistence, it is difficult to see this as heralding a
generalised and sustained rise in the price level or as requiring a
permanent change in relative prices. As of now, this unusual series of
one-off shocks remains the most plausible explanation. If this view is
correct, one would expect food prices to start falling relative to other
prices during 2002.
What is definitely more worrying is that the persistence of high inflation
has not been confined to headline inflation but has also been evident in
core inflation, which, by construction, factors out the direct impact of
erratic movements in fresh food and energy prices. On the basis of
producer prices (more articulated models provide basically the same
indication), core inflation should have peaked in November/December,
but in fact it peaked later and the decline in core inflation thereafter has
been much slower than anticipated.
But where does the stubbornness of core inflation come from, given that
demand conditions have been weak and, as discussed above, the timing of
the acceleration in M3 does not really fit the explanation of ample
liquidity as the primary source of inflationary pressure? An analysis of
the sub-components of core inflation provides some clues.
The first thing to notice is that the food price hikes included processed
food, the prices of which are typically linked more to demand conditions
than supply shocks. This time, possibly because of the extraordinary
number, magnitude and persistence of the disturbances, processed food
inflation was involved too, with a peak close to 4%. Reassuringly the
Figure 2.11  Core inflation and producer prices
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worst seems behind us; core food inflation is now rapidly declining and
should continue to do so in the following months.
The most traditional part of the core inflation index, the goods
component, has so far behaved more closely in line with expectations.
10
However, core goods inflation declined only very modestly in spite of the
upstream downward pressures coming from the fall in PPI inflation,
showing little sensitivity to weaker demand conditions, possibly as a
result of the second-round effects of oil-price hikes and the depreciation
of the euro. Inflation in services, instead, continued its upward trend
notwithstanding the weakening of demand. There are special
circumstances, such as the introduction of the euro, that may account, at
least in part, for these developments, particularly with reference to
services (see section 4 below). Yet, another, more compelling (and
worrying!) explanation can be put forward. The slow decline in inflation
could simply be the other side of the coin of the fall in productivity
growth in 2001 that was documented in Chapter 1.
It is not yet possible at this stage to establish the persistence of the
decline in productivity growth and the extent of the related upward
pressures on costs and prices. The productivity shock may only be
                                                
10 It has to be recalled that, as a result of a change in the methodology of
recording the impact of end-of-season sales in Italy and Spain, the data since
January have been affected by an unusual volatility (the seasonal pattern is
changing because of the introduction of the new methodology).
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temporary and, if it were permanent, a close link between productivity
developments and wage determination could avoid the welfare loss of
cost-push inflation and the ensuing reaction by the ECB. Nevertheless,
the persistence of inflation in this environment of slow growth forcefully
points to a deep-seated malaise in (most of) the economies in the euro
area. A rigid economic structure that generates only sluggish growth is
bound to react to shocks without persistent tensions on prices,
notwithstanding both wage moderation and a credible central bank.
Conclusions on the assessment of the monetary stance
The analysis of this section does not point to major policy mistakes on the
part of the ECB. We sketch below the general picture that is emerging.
After tightening from end-1999 to the end of 2000, monetary conditions
were eased throughout 2001 as the economic situation deteriorated and
the terrorist attack led to a collapse in consumer and business confidence.
The easing of monetary conditions was largely due to rising inflation
rates in H1, but was reinforced by historically rapid cuts in interest rates
in H2.
A number of observers have argued that the ECB should have cut interest
rates more (and more rapidly) because i) nominal interest rates remained
higher than they were at any stage during 1999, although growth was
much weaker, and ii) the US cut interest rates far more aggressively.
The above analysis shows that there is little support for this argument.
Real interest rates in the euro area are currently lower than they have
been at any time since 1996. If one deflates nominal rates by core
inflation, real rates are more than half a percentage point lower than they
were at the 1999 trough. US core inflation, by contrast, was roughly
constant throughout 2001, thus requiring, other things being equal, a
larger reduction of the nominal interest rate. But things on the two sides
of the Atlantic were not equal, as the extent of the slowdown in the US
was much larger than in the euro area (3 percentage points for the US
versus a little above 1.5 for the euro area). MCI indicators confirm that
the easing of monetary conditions was quite fast, while the rapid growth
of money and credit aggregates practically rules out the possibility that
there might have been a risk of deflation or a credit crunch.
Rather, the speed of money growth and the surprising persistence of both
headline and core inflation trigger the opposite question: Is the monetary
stance too loose in the euro area to ensure price stability? Or, to ask the
question more poignantly, is the euro area on the verge of stagflationAN ASSESSMENT OF ECB POLICY
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given that growth is slow, productivity developments are disappointing,
as we have seen in Chapter 1, and inflation is still high?
Stagflation is a highly charged word, which takes our collective memory
back to the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, which were characterised by
double-digit inflation rates and accommodating monetary polices in the
(vain) hope of reducing the output cost of supply shocks. This type of
policy response is, fortunately, behind us and so is, presumably,
stagflation. The risk of a persistently poor growth performance
accompanied by inflation bouts every time an adverse shock hits the euro
area is instead very real.
Optimists can certainly submit that the slow decline in inflation merely
resulted from a series of one-off, special shocks that happened at a
moment of slow demand and that temporarily delayed the decline in core
inflation that was expected on the basis of upstream downward pressures.
They can also point to some hard evidence in favour of their argument
and might feel vindicated if eventually core inflation falls decisively in
the next few months. Nevertheless, it is difficult to totally dismiss the
notion that the succession of negative surprises on inflation is the
symptom of an inflexible economic system that can only generate
disappointing improvements in productivity and sluggish growth. After
all, it is surprising to see an industrialised economy so deeply affected by
a shock to the food sector.
Monetary policy cannot solve the structural rigidities that underpin the
euro area’s tendency towards the ‘new stagflation’ apparent in recent
developments. Nor can it generate the political resolve needed to
implement appropriate reforms in sensitive areas. The actions and trade-
offs that the euro-area economy faces, however, are shaped by the degree
of its flexibility. The fall in productivity experienced in 2002 makes the
objective of pushing inflation below 2% even more difficult to achieve.
3.  Does the ECB follow the Fed?
The belief that the ECB follows the Fed is so entrenched in the minds of
market participants and commentators that the search for empirical
support would seem at one time a waste of energy and a trivial task. We
engaged in this search and found it far less straightforward than
conventional wisdom would suggest. To anticipate the conclusion, we
found little support for the proposition that the ECB systematically
follows the Fed (or its converse).
The starting point has been the analysis of the financial variable most
representative of money market conditions, the 3-month interest rate. IfFISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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the ECB had systematically followed the evolution in the US,
11 this
would be reflected in the data with changes in US interest rates leading
changes in Euroland rates.
Figure 2.13  Three-month interest rates in the euro area and the US
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Figure 2.13 plots the two series in question since the start of EMU. At
first sight, it would suggest that the US was leading Euroland both when
interest rates were going up, from the trough in early 1999 and when they
fell, starting in early 2000. Most observers conclude from this inspection
that the ECB mimicked the Fed in its monetary decisions. However, this
popular belief
12 cannot be corroborated by statistical analysis.
The procedure used here to ascertain the existence of a follower-leader
relationship was Granger-causality tests. These tests can show whether
                                                
11 The question of whether the ECB follows the Fed is intertwined with the
question of whether the US business cycle leads and determines the European
cycle. This is widely assumed, but it is not widely appreciated that this is not
evident in the data. There is one simple fact that suggests that if there is a
determining influence of the US cycle on Europe, it cannot have come via the
traditional channels. This fact is simply that net exports did not contribute to the
2001 slowdown in Euroland (the contribution of net exports to demand growth
was approximately the same in 2000 and 2001). The contagion must thus have
come through other channels.
12 See Begg et al. (2002, p. 42) see a time lag between Fed and ECB interest rate
decisions. They attribute the reason for the Fed moving first to the US cycle
leading the eurozone.AN ASSESSMENT OF ECB POLICY
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past values of a certain variable (e.g. US interest rates) influence another
variable (e.g. euro interest rates) after one has taken into account the
patterns that might link the second variable (euro rates) to its own past.
We ran a battery of statistical tests covering a variety of periods, for
example the entire euro period (1999-early 2002).
13 All these tests gave
the result that US interest rates influence (or rather are related to) euro
interest rates during the same month. However, the US interest rate of the
previous month did not have a statistically significant influence on this
month’s euro interest rate when all these other factors were taken into
account.
14 This suggests that the visual impression of a US leadership
over the entire euro period might be misleading.
All in all, it appears that there is no compelling statistical evidence
proving that the ECB follows the Fed. But this absence of evidence also
works the other way round. It is impossible to prove that the two are
independent from each other because the moves on both sides of the
Atlantic seemed to be so often contemporaneous. This is actually what
one would expect if the most important shocks have come from global
financial markets and both have been equally quick to respond to them.
Our conclusion is supported by Peiró (2002, p. 149), who finds ‘a
preponderance of synchronic over dynamic relationships [which] can be
regarded as evidence in favour of those theories that attribute the origin
of world cycles to common shocks’.
Table 2.1 below gives a sample of the type of results we obtained. The
Annex provides further details of dozens of regression results for
different time periods which all lead to the same conclusion: there is no
evidence against the hypothesis that the ECB does not follow the Fed. All
in all, it thus appears that there is no statistical evidence that proves that
the ECB follows the Fed. But this absence of evidence works also the
other way round: It is impossible to prove that the two are independent
from each other because the moves on both sides of the Atlantic seemed
to be so often contemporaneous. This is actually what one would expect
if the most important shocks have come from global financial markets
and both have been equally quick to respond to them. Our conclusion is
supported by Peiró (2002, p. 149), who finds ‘a preponderance of
                                                
13 We used first differences, i.e. changes in interest rates, since the level series
seemed to contain a unit root. More details are provided in the Annex.
14 Incidentally by looking at the behaviour of US interest rates over time, we
found that euro interest rates also influence US interest rates, again during the
same month.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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synchronic over dynamic relationships [which] can be regarded as
evidence in favour of those theories that attribute the origin of world
cycles to common shocks.’
Table 2.1 Regression of the 3-month interest rate in the euro area on the
3-month interest rate in the US (in first differences)
Dependent variable: DI3MEUR (first difference in US 3-month interest rates)
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 40 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.060981 0.019580 3.114509 0.0037
DI3MEUR(-1) 0.117330 0.093137 1.259759 0.2161
DI3MUSA 0.504483 0.074507 6.770927 0.0000
D9812 -0.596453 0.116671 -5.112250 0.0000
D9904 -0.401243 0.116463 -3.445241 0.0015
R-squared 0.742952     Mean dependent var. -0.007250
Adjusted R-squared 0.713575     S.D. dependent var. 0.214380
S.E. of regression 0.114733     Akaike info criterion -1.375941
Sum squared residuals 0.460732     Schwarz criterion -1.164831
Log likelihood 32.51882     F-statistic 25.29034
Durbin-Watson stat 1.630207     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000
4. ECB strategy: Too timid steps but in the right direction
The ECB strategy has two pillars. So have the critiques that have been
levied at it. The first one – indeed the one shared by the vast majority of
commentators – is the criticism of the prominent role assigned to money.
The second one hinges on the contention that communications could be
more effective, clear and transparent. Although no drastic and explicit
change has taken place in the period under review, improvements on both
fronts have to be acknowledged. The emphasis on money-growth
developments when explaining monetary policy decisions has been vastly
reduced, at least de facto, and ECB Council members have shown greater
discipline as regards public statements, particularly after the November
2001 meeting. Nevertheless, shortcomings in the strategy remain. Indeed
the improvements that took place last year demonstrate that progress is
possible, strengthening the case for quick improvements to the current
strategy and communications policy. As argued in last year’s MPG
report, we prefer a more straightforward strategy of keeping core inflation
at 1.5% with a ±1% symmetric tolerance band’, that can also provide the
skeleton of a simple framework for effective communications.AN ASSESSMENT OF ECB POLICY
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Does the public need to understand arcane monetary analysis?
The massive shifts in liquidity preference that occurred in the period
under review have exposed the weakness of the difference between
money growth and its medium-term reference value as an indicator of
inflation or activity. The importance of money growth in the ECB
strategy has not led to major policy mistakes (imagine the ECB calling a
press conference on September 17
th to explain that, despite the worries
about the possibility of an incipient recession, fast money growth made it
impossible to cut policy rates…). However, the schizophrenia between
the lip service invariably paid to the first pillar and actual policy
decisions has irreparably undermined the notion of a reliable,
straightforward link between developments in money growth and the
setting of the interest rate. This in turn makes it impossible to assign a
leading role to developments in M3 in the effective communications to
the public of the rationale underpinning monetary policy decisions.
The gap between the strong acceleration in M3 and the 125-bp cut in
policy rates in 70 days late in 2001 was so blatantly wide that it provided
an ideal opportunity to take rapid steps to modify the strategy. It would
have been uncontroversial to jettison the first pillar at that point in time.
This would still have left the ECB free to exploit the information (if any)
conveyed by developments in monetary and credit aggregates. Close
attention to money growth, which we regard as part and parcel of central
banking, need not be associated with the incessant repetition that the
central bank must, and actually does, scrutinise M3 developments – often
to discover that they convey no useful signals on inflation. Ultimately, a
disproportionate amount of time and attention has been devoted in
official documents and statements to explaining why money had de facto
to be ignored and yet it had to remain a fundamental and indispensable
element of analysis – and communications. This has added an
unnecessary obstacle to clear communications with the public,
particularly because statistical problems have once again plagued M3.
2001 was the annus horribilis for the intelligibility of money data.
Statistics were changed twice to correct for assets held by non-residents.
Moreover, stock/flow adjustments (i.e. statistical amendments to the raw
stock series to correct for the effects of ‘non-transaction-related’
variations, due e.g. to changes in the exchange rate, reclassifications, re-
valuations) were once again sizeable, even in a year when the exchange
rate (a cause for the stock/flow adjustment that is immediately
understandable) did not fluctuate much. What is gained by obstinately
insisting that M3 plays a prominent role in monetary policy strategy?FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Figure 2.14  Different corrections to M3 data
Transparency and communication
Last year’s MPG report identified a huge gap between the formal and the
perceived transparency of the ECB. A novel indicator put forward by
Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001) – which captures the way a central bank
interacts with the public, market participants and the other institutions in
the society – shows unambiguously that the ECB is formally a very
transparent institution, definitely more so than the Federal Reserve. On
the other hand, the ECB ranked at the bottom of the scale among major
- 5
0
5
10
15
- 5051 0 1 5
M3   %  mo m  annual i sed  grow th 
based  on  actual   m oney  stock
M
3
 
%
 
m
o
m
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
s
e
d
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
a
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
E
C
B
M3   grow th  based  on  stocks 
vs  flow s:   1999  -   2001
Figure 2.15  The effect of stock/flows adjustments on M3 growth
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2000 2001 2002
M3   corr ect ed  f or   non- r esi dent   hol di ngs
of   shares  and  uni t s
M3   corr ect ed  f or   non- r esi dent   hol di ngs
of   al l   negot i abl e  i nst r um ent s
M3   not   corr ect ed
Thr eshol dAN ASSESSMENT OF ECB POLICY
51
central banks in surveys conducted with market participants. The limited
track record of the ECB is certainly a reason for this gap. Other factors
play a role too.
First, in several instances in the past,
15 the ECB surprised the market
despite the fact it has explicitly rejected unpredictability as one of its
goals (see Issing et al., 2001). As shown by the chart plotting the three-
month rate against the refi rate, after the major surprise in April/May last
year, the ECB did not wrong-foot the market again. This is undoubtedly a
sign that communications between the markets and the ECB are getting
better – whether because of improvements on the ECB side or the
adaptation of market participants to the ECB’s jargon and idiosyncrasies.
Secondly, the abundance of occasional public statements on the part of
Council members has always been a source of confusion. Too many
voices have at best diluted the effectiveness of the single message
(soloists, in this context, are definitely preferable to choirs), and at worst
have sent conflicting messages and created the impression of sharp
disagreements within the Council. As recalled before, the problem of
conflicting statements generating confusion in the market was
particularly acute before the Council meeting of 11 November 2001. In
the press conference following the meeting, the President explicitly stated
that his role in communications would become greater – a point later
reiterated before the European Parliament. In the wake of these
announcements, Council members other than the President became less
vocal in public on monetary policy matters, thereby providing a very
useful contribution to the clarity of ECB communications.
Thirdly, the publication of forecasts has not proved to be the means to
enhanced clarity and transparency of communications that many had
hoped. The internal process preceding publication is far too long and by
the time the forecasts appear in the public domain, they no longer reflect
the current state of thinking in the ECB. Very wide and symmetric ranges
accompany the forecast for the key variables, with little information on
the balance of risks surrounding the central projection. Most importantly,
it is not at all clear what role, if any, is played by the forecast in the
decision-making process. In sum, the publication of forecasts is a missed
opportunity to provide information on the framework adopted by the
ECB to assess developments and the risks surrounding them. Why not
take it?
                                                
15 See Gros et al. (2001, p. 53).FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Figure 2.16  Policy rates and market rates
Fourthly, market participants frequently lament blunders and glitches in
communications from the ECB. An objective assessment of this sort of
anecdotal evidence is, needless to say, impossible. We just want to note
its existence and recall one major slip-up illustrating the phenomena. On
the 17th of September, the routine weekly operational tender was sent out
offering banks liquidity at a minimum bid rate of 4.25%. Later on the
same day, the ECB released the statement announcing that the ‘minimum
bid rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be
reduced by 0.50 percentage point to 3.75%. Differently from what was
communicated in an announcement at 3.30 p.m. today, this change in the
minimum bid rate will be effective starting from tomorrow's operation’.
Conclusion on Strategy and Communications
The ECB is learning from experience, no doubt, and its communications
policy has improved. Shortcomings nevertheless remain – most notably,
the insistence in making M3 developments a lynchpin of the way
monetary policy decisions are motivated, despite the erratic link between
the rate of money growth and actual interest rate policy. This critique is
neither new (we put it forward in previous reports) nor original (plenty of
other analysts have also levied it), but, alas, it still applies. In other areas,
communications and transparency could also be improved – for example
further strengthening the role of the President in signalling incipient
changes in the assessment of the economic outlook or exploiting the
opportunity offered by the publication of the ECB forecasts to convey
information on the risks associated with the central scenario.
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5. The key strategic objective: Is ‘below 2%’ too tight?
Although the ECB's monetary policy strategy is vulnerable to criticism on
several accounts, it would be very difficult to argue that the deficiencies
in strategy and communications have led to serious policy mistakes. This
section addresses one key aspect of the strategy – the very definition of
the objective of monetary policy. In this area, as argued below, the risk of
flaws in the strategy seriously misguiding policy action potentially looms
much higher.
Domestic Balassa-Samuelson
The discussion of why inflation has been so stubborn in the first months
of 2002 pointed to the prices of services as the main culprit, given that
they keep rising at well above 3%. This in itself would not be a problem
since the target of the ECB is the overall consumer price index. And
indeed the fact that goods prices generally increase much less than
services prices is not a particularly recent development, but rather is a
persistent longer-run phenomenon.
The reason for this long-run trend is well understood: the relative price of
goods falls because productivity grows faster in goods production than in
the provision of services (the famous example is that of haircuts, where it
is difficult to envisage productivity increases). The long-term trend in
relative prices is documented in Figure 2.17, which shows the ratio of
proxies of goods and services prices, namely the implicit price deflator of
gross value-added in manufacturing versus that in services for the euro
area, Japan and the US. In all of these three large economies, this ratio
shows a clear trend, with a rate of decline of about 2% p.a. (cumulative
about 40% over 20 years). There is no reason to expect that this trend will
stop, so that services inflation can be expected to continue to be higher
than goods inflation.
The fact that services inflation is consistently higher than goods inflation
– a necessary development to ensure the adjustment of relative prices –
raises the question of whether one actually needs goods price deflation in
order to achieve an overall inflation rate below 2%. To take a concrete
example, assume that the weight of services in the HICP is 50% (with
goods making up the remainder). With services inflation currently
running at 3.2%, an HICP inflation of 2% would require goods price
inflation of 0.8%. HICP inflation of 1.6% (which is still near the upper
end of the 0-2% acceptable range) would require complete price stability
(literally 0 inflation) in goods, and as this is an average across countries,FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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goods price deflation would have to take place in a number of countries
for an average level of 0% to be achieved.
Figure 2.17  Manufacturing vs services prices
This suggests that the 2% upper bound to inflation chosen by the ECB
might be too tight in order to allow for the normal trend developments in
relative prices to take place without actually requiring widespread price
falls in a large part of the economy. Although in principle there is no
problem in achieving adjustments in relative prices through a fall in
certain nominal prices, there is a substantive body of empirical evidence
16
(also for economic systems that can be expected to be more flexible than
the euro area, e.g. the US) that this entails an unnecessary loss in output.
The numbers for the euro area are not quite as simple as suggested in the
example above, but they are close: the ratio of prices of manufacturing to
services has fallen by about 1.4% p.a. over the last two decades. Since
services account for about 38% of the HICP, it follows that an HICP
inflation rate of 1% (the middle of the 0-2% range of the ECB) and the
current rate of services inflation leaves no room for inflation in goods
prices. An overall HICP inflation rate of 1.5% leaves room for 0.5%
goods price inflation, but one-half of one percentage point remains
uncomfortably close to deflation, not only because it would be an average
across the 12 countries of the eurozone, but also because it corresponds
roughly to the size of the quality bias, i.e. the fact that inflation is
                                                
16 See e.g. Akerlof et al. (1996), Fehr and Tyran (2001) and Levy et al. (2002).
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generally held to be overestimated because quality improvements at
constant prices correspond in reality to falling prices.
The argument made here that the inflation target of the ECB might be too
tight is related to the results of other studies that yield similar conclusions
but for different reasons, namely that differences in national price levels
require differences in national inflation rates. For example, Sinn and
Reutter (2001) argue that inflation in Germany should on average be 1%
lower than the average of the euro area because the difference in
productivity growth between traded and non-traded goods prices is much
lower in Germany than elsewhere in the euro area. They conclude that
inflation in the euro area has to be at least 0.94%, if Germany is not to
experience deflation. Cross-country differences in sectoral productivity
growth rates could thus compound the problem identified here for the
euro-area average. If the CPI of Germany is constant, any differential in
productivity growth would require deflation in manufacturing.
Will Germany normalise?
The conclusion of Sinn and Reutter (2001) and of other similar studies is
based on data from the 1980s and early 1990s. In principle one should
use a much longer-run time series to uncover structural trends, but this is
rendered difficult by the break in data for Germany coming with
unification. This is not only a data problem, but one has to ask whether it
is reasonable to assume that the unified Germany will behave like West
Germany in the past, i.e. with a difference in productivity, and hence
relative prices, much smaller than in the rest of the Union, as shown in
the chart below.
Unification brought important changes to the position of Germany
relative to its European partners. In 1990, (West)Germany had, by a
considerable margin, the highest GDP per capita (measured at PPP)
among the group of countries that now form the euro area (excluding
Luxembourg). In this context, it was reasonable to assume that Germany
should have the highest price level for services and should thus constitute
the ‘anchor’ country for the entire area. By now, however, Germany has
lost its special position and is today exactly in the middle, almost tied for
5
th and 6
th place out of 11 with Italy. It is thus possible that from now on
(united) Germany is no longer the anchor country in terms of prices.
If the relationship between manufacturing and services prices in Germany
‘normalises’, the argument made here would be reinforced. Figure 2.18
shows that for the rest of the eurozone the trend decline in the relativeFISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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price of manufacturing has been slightly over 2% p.a. over the last two
decades.
Neo-Keynesians rejoice! Menu costs for real
The arguments discussed above provide the rationale for higher inflation
in the services sector in the long run. In the period under review, this
tendency was exacerbated by special, temporary factors.
Indeed as Figure 2.19 shows, services inflation accelerated briskly,
moving from 3% to 3.5% in 2002. The acceleration was particularly
pronounced in Spain and France.
Turning to the items that provided a major push to services inflation,
more than 0.3 percentage points of the increase can be traced to the hike
in prices of ‘restaurants and cafés’, which makes up 6.7% of the basket in
Europe (but as high as nearly 14% in Spain) and 27.1% of core (core
services). This acceleration is most likely to be related to the introduction
of the euro, which has provided the opportunity to pass on to the
consumer the increases in costs (food is an important intermediate good
for restaurants) and some widening of the margin on the occasion of a
major re-pricing exercise. After all, if menu costs do not provide a
justification for ‘lumpy’ changes in prices for restaurants, where else
should they?
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Figure 2.19  Core service inflation by country, % yoy
Figure 2.20  Inflation in restaurants and cafés
An international comparison
How does the ECB stack up compared to other central banks in mature
economies? Table 2.2 shows a summary of the inflation objectives for
seven industrialised countries. The key fact that emerges from this table
is that the average of the inflation ceilings imposed among these countries
is one percentage point higher than the ceiling of 2% set by the ECB. In
this sense the ECB is a clear outlier. Another way to notice the extent to
which the ECB is more ambitious than its peers is to note that all central
banks that set quantitative objectives for inflation have upper limits
higher than 2% and the lower limit is in only one other case equal to zero.
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Moreover, except for Australia and New Zealand, all countries set a band
around a central target. An easy way to allow for a higher inflation
ceiling would be to simply set a band around a central inflation objective.
A band of plus or minus 1%, for instance, would additionally help to raise
the floor for inflation above the current 0%. Table 2.3 provides some
further information on how inflation targets are being established and the
inflation rate at the time the inflation target was selected. While in some
cases inflation targets were used to lower inflation, it seems that in many
cases the target reflected the inflation rate of the time.
Table 2.2  Summary statistics for targets and bands in inflation targeting
regimes and a comparison with the ECB
Target Band Minimum Maximum
Australia
 a b 2.5 0.5 2 3
Canada 2 1 1 3
Iceland 2.5 1.5 1 4
New Zealand 
a b 1.5 1.5 0 3
Norway 2.5 1 1.5 3.5
Sweden 2 1 1 3
United Kingdom 
b 2.5 1 1.5 3.5
Average 2.2 1.1 1.1 3.3
ECB - - 0 2
a Since in these cases the precise target is not stated, only the range of price stability, i.e.
the middle point of the range, was taken as the target.
b Target defined in terms of indexes excluding volatile components.
Is there any reason why the ECB should be more ambitious than other
central banks in the world? The answer appears to be no on a number of
counts. We agree with the arguments that are already well known, for
example, as recalled above, that the heterogeneity of the eurozone means
a low average inflation target might imply deflation in some countries.
We can, however, add a new argument: the eurozone is less dynamic than
many of the other inflation-targeting countries. This implies that, ceteris
paribus, it will be more difficult to achieve price stability, especially
during the adjustment period to lower productivity growth.59
Table 2.3  Inflation targets at selected inflation-targeting central banks
a At the time of the announcement.
b CPI, consumer price index, excluding fruit and vegetables, petrol, interest costs, public sector prices and other volatile prices.
c In practice policy decisions are also based on underlying CPI - excluding food, energy and first-round effects of indirect taxes.
d CPI, consumer price index, excluding credit services. In practice decisions are based on a measure of underlying inflation.
e Retail price index excluding mortgage interest payments.
Note: Among emerging market countries, Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Israel, Mexico, Poland, South Africa and Thailand have also adopted a
formal inflation targeting framework.
Source: Almeida and Goodhart (1998) and Bank of Iceland Monetary Bulletin 2001/2.
Country Index Target Actual
Inflation
a
1)  Exceptions
2)  Consequences of failure to attain target
Australia CPI
(Underlying) 
b
2-3% on
average
1.9% 1)  None.
2)  Does not trigger any extraordinary procedure, but the CB must prepare an
annual report, for presentation to the Treasurer and tabling in Parliament.
Canada CPI 
c 2% (+ 1%) 3.9% 1)  Large increases in oil prices, natural disasters.
2)  Does not trigger any extraordinary procedure.
Iceland CPI 
c 2.5% (+1.5%) 4.1% 1)  Short-lived deviations, such as temporary supply shocks.
2)  Letter of explanation required.
New
Zealand
CPI (until 1996)
CPIX (since
1997)
d
0-2%
0-3%
3.3%
1.8%
1)  Significant changes in indirect taxes or government charges, import or export
prices, natural disasters (and significant changes in interest costs up to 1996).
2)  Outcomes outside the range must be explained in policy statements.
Norway CPI 
c 2.5% (+ 1%) 3.0% 1)  Direct effects resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties, and
extraordinarily temporary disturbances.
2)  A thorough assessment is required in the annual report.
Sweden CPI 2% (+ 1%) 1.8% 1)  None.
2)  Does not trigger any extraordinary procedure.
UK RPIX 
e 2.5% (+ 1%) 4.0% 1)  Effects of indirect taxes and subsidies and interest costs.
2)  Letter of explanation required.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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How and when is the 2% ceiling to be raised?
The analysis in this section has provided another argument in favour of
raising the ceiling of the ECB inflation objective. The secular trend in
relative prices requires roughly 2% higher inflation for services than for
goods. If 2% is the maximum admissible for the overall HICP inflation,
monetary policy might end up forcing too-low inflation in the goods
sector with a detrimental deflationary bias and an associated output and
welfare loss. This argument is additional to the others that have been put
forward in favour of raising the 2% threshold – namely the 2% for the
whole area that might require ‘quasi-deflation’ in some countries to allow
for the adjustment in relative prices across countries in the Union due to
the Balassa-Samuelson effect; the overestimation of actual price increases
due to neglected quality improvements when measuring prices.
Even though the arguments in favour are compelling, we are fully aware
that the proposal to raise the 2% limit would involve very delicate issues
in communications. Unavoidably, there is a risk that lifting the 2% limit
is misinterpreted as a dilution of the resolve to fight inflation, eroding the
credibility of the ECB with detrimental consequences on inflation
expectations and asset prices, most notably long-term interest rates. A
clear explanation of the rationale motivating the revision in the
qualitative definition of the objective, while maintaining the Treaty remit
of price stability, is the only way to tackle this issue and make clear that
no weaker commitment to the ultimate goal of monetary policy is
intended. The fact that all central banks that set quantitative objectives for
inflation have upper limits higher than 2% should also be noted, which
may help assuage some concerns.
Moreover, the choice of the timing for the introduction of the change
could also help. By taking advantage of the fall in inflation below 2% that
should occur later this year, one could allay the suspicion that the change
was forced by the inability to respect the present upper limit for inflation.
In any event, no contrivance or argument, no matter how smart or
sophisticated, can solve the communications problem entirely. The risk
that raising the 2% threshold is misconstrued as a softer attitude towards
inflation cannot be avoided and, in the short run, credibility may suffer.
Yet, both possible alternatives to an explicit and motivated change in the
inflation objective are definitely worse.
The first possibility would be to continue with the attitude adopted so far.
The ECB might continue de facto to consider 2% not as an inviolable
threshold but as a ‘reference value’, the overshooting of which need notAN ASSESSMENT OF ECB POLICY
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necessarily trigger the tightening of monetary policy. By invoking the
reference to ‘the medium term’ (the qualifier of price stability providing
flexibility to cope with temporary shocks), the ECB could maintain the
current definition of its objective while avoiding unwarranted monetary
restrictions when inflation and inflation expectations remain under
control – even though somewhat above 2%. The arguments discussed
above, however, suggest that such a situation is bound to become
embarrassingly frequent over time and, ultimately, to build up a track
record that defies 2% as an upward limit for inflation. Accepting that this
happens would only erode the credibility of the ECB without addressing
the issue in a sustainable way. With the benefit of hindsight, we know
that the circumstances at the end of 1998, when the threshold was set,
were exceptionally favourable for inflation to be kept below 2% (as well
as for M3 growth to be very close to 4.5%). Clinging to the hope that
similar circumstances will occur again (and sufficiently frequently!) does
not look like a sensible, forward-looking option.
The second possibility would be to run monetary policy so as to ensure
that inflation remains in the 0-2% range (nearly) always, accepting the
costs that this might entail in the presence of sizeable secular changes in
relative prices and substantive downward rigidities of nominal prices.
Paying such a high price to respect a self-imposed discipline, decided at a
quite peculiar moment in time, does not look like a sensible option either.
Raising the 2% upper limit for inflation is not an easy policy choice. The
rationale for it is strong but a certain risk of misinterpretation as a
reduced commitment to price stability is unavoidable. Even though
distasteful, this choice is nevertheless much better than the alternatives.62
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 2
DOES THE ECB FOLLOW THE FED?
In this Annex we will outline our statistical approach in more detail. As
explained in the main text, we took the 3-month short-term interest rate of
the US and the euro area, which is the most widely watched indicator of
short-term monetary conditions.
Preliminaries
The first step in empirical work concerned the choice of the statistical
procedure. We chose the simplest available procedure to ascertain the
existence of a follower-leader relationship; i.e. the so-called Granger-
causality tests (and related approaches). These tests can show whether
past values of a certain variable (e.g. US interest rates) influence another
variable (e.g. euro interest rates) after one has taken into account the
patterns that might link the second variable (euro rates) to its own past.
In order to make sure that our results do not depend on the particular test
period chosen, we ran a battery of statistical tests for a number of periods,
e.g. covering the entire euro period (1999-early 2002) and different
periods from 1995 onwards.
Before we ran our regressions, however, we had to take into account an
important empirical caveat. Since the level series seems to contain a unit
root
17 and Granger causality tests tend to give misleading results if the
variables considered in the VAR contain unit roots, it was first tested
whether the interest rates were actually stationary during the time period
considered. The results of the unit root tests are summarised in the
following two tables separately for euro and US dollar interest rates. It
appears that the series have to be differenced once (to get the change in
interest rates between two periods) in order to make them stationary. The
null hypothesis in each case is that the variable under consideration is
stationary.
                                           
17 The level series does not fluctuate around a constant mean and its variance is
not constant and finite.ANNEX TO CHAPTER 2
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Table A2.1  Unit Root Tests
Panel A
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test for the euro interest rate
(I3MEUR)
Levels Differences
Sample ADF Test
Statistic
Lag
order
Sample ADF Test Statistic Lag
order
1990:06
2002:04
-1.176552 4 1990:07
2002:04
-3.359015** 4
1995:01
2002:04
-2.418961 2 1995:01
2002:04
-3.903129*** 2
1995:01
2000:12
-1.954167 2 1995:01
2000:12
-3.441197** 2
*** (**, *) indicates significance of the ADF test statistics at the 1% (5%, 10%) critical
value. MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Panel B
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test for the US interest rate (I3USA)
Levels Differences
Sample ADF Test
Statistic
Lag
order
Sample ADF Test
Statistic
Lag
order
1990:06
2002:04
-1.969106 4 1990:07 2002:04 -3.490301*** 4
1995:01
2002:04
0.040917 2 1995:01 2002:04 -3.661004*** 2
1995:01
2000:12
-1.636026 2 1995:01 2000:12 -4.706848*** 2
*** (**, *) indicates significance of the ADF test statistics at the 1% (5%, 10%) critical
value. MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
The clear conclusion that one has to draw from the above standard unit
root tests is that both the euro (I3MEUR) and the US interest rate
(I3MUSA) cannot be rejected to be integrated of order 1 (i.e. a time series
of the changes is stationary). This implies that the following Granger
causality tests must be done in first differences, i.e. changes in interest
rate. It is also a first indication that Figure 2.13 in the main text, which
suggests a leader-follower relationship in levels, might be misleading.
Granger causality?
The next step was to use a standard statistical package to establish
whether there is a follower-leader relationship between the changes in
these two interest rates. The results are tabulated below.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
64
We are well aware that the results often heavily depend on the lag
structure. For robustness reasons and with an eye on our hypothesis of a
possible break in the relation around the turn of the year 2000-01, we also
use a variety of different sample periods. Thus a range of results is
summarised below.
 Table A2.2  Results of Granger causality test by sample
period and lag length
Sample period Lags: 2 Lags: 4 Lags: 12
1990:01 2002:04 0/0 0/0 0/0
1995:01 2000:12 0/0 0/0 0/0
1990:01 2002:04 0/0 0/0 0/0
2000:01 2002:04 0/0 0/0 NA
1999:01 2000:12 0/0 0/0 NA
1999:01 2002:04 0/0 0/0 NA
NA: Not available.
Source: Own calculations. N.B. an entry 0/0 means that that there
is no statistically significant influence, neither from the
US on the euro, nor vice-versa.
In no case does one have to reject the null hypothesis that the US interest
rate does not ‘Granger cause’ the euro interest rate and vice versa. This
result obtains if we operate at the usual 5% significance level. There is
only one exception, using 12 lags and the sample period 1995:01 to
2000:12. Only in this one case is the US interest rate significant at the
10% level, in the equation for the euro interest rate. But using the same
specification for the US interest rate, we also find that it is determined by
the euro interest rate.
Bivariate VARs
One objection to the standard tests performed so far is that the ‘normal
Granger causality tests’ might be unduly influenced by particular
episodes. This is why we also looked a bit more into detail in the
bivariate relationships. Vector autoregressions (VAR) allow us to identify
the lag structure that seems to give the best econometric fit, as compared
to other specifications. For the same reason as above, we stress
regressions based on first differences here. Thus we take the euro interest
rate change as the dependent variable and try to explain its variation by
past changes of the euro interest rate as well as by contemporaneous and
past changes of the US interest rate. The US interest rate can be said to
‘cause’ the euro interest rate if at least one of the coefficients on past US
interest rate changes is significantly different from zero. Thus, aANNEX TO CHAPTER 2
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significant effect of a positive sign implies that one can reject the
hypothesis that the change in the US interest rate does not influence the
current change of the euro interest rate at the usual confidence levels. Of
course, our special interest is on the significance of the coefficient of the
lagged change in the US interest rate.
Although we also ran regressions over the whole available sample, i.e.
from 1990 onwards (and these regressions essentially gave the same
results), we only display the results from the regressions over the sample
1995:01 to 2002:04. We present the best specifications (according to
model selection criteria such as the Schwarz criterion) of three types of
regressions. The first is the best specification possible without the
implementation of dummies. In the second, dummies were used to
capture the euro changeover and a surprise interest rate cut by the ECB.
Although the lagged change in US interest rates were not found to be
significant, we chose a third specification to test, whether a structural
break in the coefficient on the lagged change of the US interest rate could
nonetheless be identified.
Table A2.3  Bivariate Regression Results
Panel a) Sample: 1995:01 2000:12
Included observations: 72
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.003735 0.016152 -0.231243 0.8178
DI3MEUR(-1) 0.261255 0.100069 2.610761 0.0111
DI3MUSA 0.572728 0.117752 4.863846 0.0000
R-squared 0.363610     Mean dependent var -0.005500
Adjusted R-squared 0.345164     S.D. dependent var 0.169323
S.E. of regression 0.137019     Akaike info criterion -1.096619
Sum squared resid 1.295422     Schwarz criterion -1.001758
Log likelihood 42.47830     F-statistic 19.71202
Durbin-Watson stat 2.159143     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Panel b) Sample: 1995:01 2000:12
Included observations: 72
Variable Coefficie
nt
Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.011147 0.014272 0.781002 0.4376
DI3MEUR(-1) 0.271398 0.087336 3.107528 0.0028
DI3MUSA 0.520474 0.103885 5.010105 0.0000
D9503 -
0.402973
0.119502 -3.372094 0.0013
D9812 -
0.317231
0.121814 -2.604218 0.0114
D9904 -
0.353868
0.119855 -2.952463 0.0044
R-squared 0.544651     Mean dependent var -0.005500
Adjusted R-squared 0.510155     S.D. dependent var 0.169323
S.E. of regression 0.118507     Akaike info criterion -1.348034
Sum squared resid 0.926898     Schwarz criterion -1.158312
Log likelihood 54.52922     F-statistic 15.78876
Durbin-Watson stat 2.192639     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Panel c) Sample: 1995:01 2000:12
Included observations: 72
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.010160 0.014330 0.709030 0.4808
DI3MEUR(-1) 0.227825 0.099514 2.289386 0.0253
DI3MUSA 0.507932 0.104905 4.841830 0.0000
DI3MUSA(-1) 0.106726 0.116367 0.917150 0.3625
D9503 -0.392562 0.120184 -3.266345 0.0017
D9812 -0.323598 0.122159 -2.649002 0.0101
D9904 -0.355953 0.120021 -2.965749 0.0042
R-squared 0.550468     Mean dependent var -0.005500
Adjusted R-squared 0.508973     S.D. dependent var 0.169323
S.E. of regression 0.118650     Akaike info criterion -1.333114
Sum squared resid 0.915057     Schwarz criterion -1.111771
Log likelihood 54.99210     F-statistic 13.26583
Durbin-Watson stat 2.095068     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Does the relationship change over time?
Both our pairwise Granger causality tests and, above all, our simple
bivariate VARs gave the result that, if at all, US interest rates influence
euro interest rates during the same month. However, the US interest rate
of the previous month did not have a statistically significant influence onANNEX TO CHAPTER 2
67
this months euro interest rate when all these other factors were taken into
account.
18 This suggests that the visual impression of a US leadership
over the entire euro period might be misleading.
One might still argue that interest rates in Europe tended to be influenced
by what had happened on the other side of the Atlantic but that this had
changed during 2001. In that year the Fed cut interest rates at an
unprecedented speed (and of an unprecedented magnitude) because it
feared an unravelling of the financial equilibria in the US. The ECB took
a more relaxed stance on this point as the eurozone economy did not
show any of the (potential) disequilibria of the US economy (current
account, consumer financial position, over-investment). Hence, one might
be tempted to conclude that over the whole sample the lagged US
interest rate change was insignificant in the regression equation for the
euro interest rate change, while it would become significant if only a
large sub-sample (namely until December 2000) had been considered. In
order to test whether this kind of reasoning is correct, we took some
efforts to search for breaks in the relation between US and euro interest
rates around the turn of year 2000-01.
From the previous analysis the following specification of our regression
equation looked best suited to us as a standard reference to test for
breaks:
DI3MEUR = C(1) + C(2)*DI3MEUR(-1) + C(3)*DI3MUSA +
C(4)*DI3MUSA(-1).
As stressed above, the coefficient C(4) of the lagged US interest rate is
the coefficient of interest here. To start with, we conducted a Wald test of
the coefficient restriction C(4)=0, a test which measures how different the
unconstrained regression is against the regression with the above
restriction.
Full sample 1995:1 - 2002:4
Wald Test:
Null
Hypothesis:
C(4)=0
F-statistic 0.022836 Probability 0.880247
Chi-square 0.022836 Probability 0.879885
                                           
18 Incidentally by looking at the behaviour of US interest rates over time we
found that euro interest rates also influence US interest rates, again during the
same month.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Limited sample 1995:1 - 2000:12
Wald Test:
Null Hypothesis: C(4)=0
F-statistic 0.785224 Probability 0.378671
Chi-square 0.785224 Probability 0.375548
Both tests clearly fail to reject the null hypothesis of C(4) = 0, i.e. the
(first difference of the) lagged US interest rate having no impact on the
current difference of the euro interest rate.
Stability over time
We now examine:
(a)  whether all the coefficients in the above regression equation are
stable around our guess of the structural break, that is 2000:12,
(b) whether the parameter C(4), i.e. the coefficient of the lagged
difference of the US interest rate, is stable across the sample without
prior fixation of a breakpoint, and
(c)  whether the coefficients are stable in general without prior fixation
of a breakpoint.
Ad (a) At first, we conducted a Chow breakpoint test, i.e. we fit the
reference equation separately for each sub-sample to see whether there
are significant differences in the estimated equations, the latter indicating
a structural change in the relationship. The new enact Chow’s forecast
test by estimating the model for the sub-sample ‘until 2000:12’ and then
– based on this estimated model – predicting the values of the difference
of the euro interest rate the dependent variable in the remaining data
points from 2001:01 on. Large forecast errors would cast doubt on the
stability of the estimated relation between euro and US interest rates.
Chow Breakpoint Test: 2001:01
F-statistic 2.606219     Probability 0.041799
Log likelihood ratio 10.77937     Probability 0.029159
Chow Forecast Test: Forecast from 2001:01 to 2002:04
F-statistic 2.085986     Probability 0.019064
Log likelihood ratio 35.14074     Probability 0.003802ANNEX TO CHAPTER 2
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Both tests indicate a structural break in the relationship, which is located
between 2000:12 and 2001:01. However, one has to be careful because
breaks might be indicated for neighboured points in time as well. A
sequential plot of the F-statistics over all data points in the sample would
have been useful here, choosing the highest point as the ‘true breakpoint’.
Ad (b) A simple approach is that of recursive estimates (of the coefficient
of the lagged difference of the US  interest rate) starting with the start of
the sample period and adding observations over time. With this approach
one can trace the evolution of this coefficient as more and more data are
used in the estimation. From the graph it can be seen that the coefficient
C(4) displays variation when more data is added, i.e. a sudden increase in
the midst of 1999 and a fall at the end of 2000, there is a strong indication
of instability and a structural break at the end of 2000. However, it has to
be noted that the significance bands throughout embrace the null,
meaning that the coefficient C(4) is never significantly different from
zero (as mirrored by the regression results).
Figure A2.1 Recursive Coefficients
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Ad (c) We also conducted a CUSUM of Squares test, which is essentially
a combination of recursive estimation and a Chow test. Movements
outside the critical 5%-lines would be suggestive of parameter instability.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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Although not crossing the lines, our test statistic in fact indicates some
instability in the equation at the end of 2000, since the test statistic nearly
touches the critical line at that point in time.
Figure A2.2  CUSUM-Test
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Conclusions
All in all, it thus appears that there is no statistical evidence that proves
that the ECB follows the Fed. But this absence of evidence also works the
other way round: It is impossible to prove that the two are independent
from each other because the moves on both sides of the Atlantic seemed
to be so often contemporaneous. This is actually what one would expect
if the most important shocks have come from global financial markets
and both have been equally quick to respond to them.71
CHAPTER 3
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY:
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
his chapter turns to fiscal policy, which has been a source of much
friction at the European level in early 2002. The main focus of this
chapter is a simple question: how effective is fiscal policy as a
demand management tool? One might surmise that a lot of empirical
evidence already exists on this issue. But, as we show below, this is not
the case. As some of the evidence we present is new and the results might
contradict some widely held notions about the effectiveness of fiscal
policy, we have preferred to outline the key technical aspects of our
results in sections 2 to 6 of this chapter. However, section 7 provides a
summary for the hurried reader who is prepared to trust the quality of the
empirical work.
1. Why look at fiscal policy?
In principle this question should not be difficult to answer. Fiscal policy
is always important, but its management becomes particular delicate in
tough times, i.e. when growth slows. The standard view of fiscal policy is
that higher public expenditure lifts demand, but this also puts pressure on
prices, thus presenting the central bank with a dilemma.
19 This argument
is intuitive enough, and needs little elaboration. But does it correspond to
reality? There is surprisingly little hard empirical evidence on this point.
This chapter presents some direct empirical evidence on the effects of
fiscal policy on the main macroeconomic variables: GDP, prices and
interest rates to put the debate about macroeconomic policies in EMU on
a sounder footing.
At the level of the euro area, the problem is compounded by the unique
position of the ECB among central banks, whereby it sets a common
monetary policy but faces twelve independent fiscal policies. This creates
further problems because the national fiscal authorities might fail to fully
                                                     
19 Another standard argument concerns the Maastricht Treaty and the Growth
and Stability Pact, which has been motivated by the threat that large deficits and
government debt would pose to the goal of price stability through various
possible channels (see e.g. Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999, and Eichengreen and
Wyplosz, 1998).
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internalise the consequences of their fiscal actions on the area-wide
monetary policy and interest rates.
The theoretical argument is again well known. Suppose inflation is a
function of the deficit via a demand effect. If the Central Bank reacts to
the increase in inflation by increasing the interest rate, when a country
increases its deficit the other countries might be hit by an interest rate
hike through no apparent fault of their own. In all these cases, a country
does not fully internalise the effects of its expansionary fiscal policies on
the other economies via the reaction function of the Central Bank.
20
This is far from a purely theoretical scenario. In fact, it is probably at the
root of the most controversial intervention to date by the European
Council in matters of fiscal policy – the action against Ireland in February
2001. This action was not motivated by a concern about the sustainability
of Irish public finances
21 (the country had a sizeable surplus), but by a
belief that some small changes in Irish fiscal policy might have a
measurable impact on macroeconomic performance that could be
predicted accurately. In particular, the official motivation of the EU
authorities (the ECOFIN Council in this case) speaks clearly of a
considerable risk for inflation (see Box 3.1 for further details).
Box 3.1 The reprimand to Ireland, some background
Ireland’s 2001 Stability Programme envisioned a reduction in the cyclically
adjusted surplus by .3 percentage points in 2001 and by a negligible amount
in 2002, starting from the highest surplus in the eurozone, 4.5% of GDP.
Most of the reduction in the surplus would have been achieved via a fall in
income and indirect taxes and a slight increase in investment. It is interesting
to go back and read the Council decision to understand the motivation of this
unprecedented measure:
…the Council considers that the stimulatory nature of the budget
for 2001 poses a considerable risk to the benign outlook in terms
of growth and inflation.[…] The strategy of inducing labour force
increases through an alleviation of the direct tax burden, which
was recommended in the 2000 broad economic policy guidelines
(BEPG)…may have become less effective than in the past,
                                                     
20 See e.g. Chari and Kehoe, 1998, and Beetsma and Bovemberg, 1998, for
another variant which emphasises debt accumulation.
21 The legal basis was therefore not the Stability Pact, but another, rather
complex set of policy coordination procedures called ‘broad economic policy
guidelines’ (BEPGs).THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY
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because it took place in the context of an expansionary budgetary
policy…Further, while indirect taxes cuts have a once-and-for-all
effect on the price level, they probably have no lasting effect on
the rate of inflation but clearly further stimulate demand (Official
Journal C 077, 9.3.2001, p. 7).
Thus, in this passage, the Council makes several other important factual
points on the empirical consequences of fiscal policy. It asserts that:
i)  a reduction in the cyclically adjusted budget surplus by .3 percentage
points of GDP has a measurable positive impact on inflation;
ii)  on the other hand, an increase in government investment has a
negative impact in inflation;
iii)  indirect tax cuts cause a reduction in inflation, but only in the short
run;
iv)  a reduction in income taxes has a negative effect on inflation…
v)  …but only if it does not take place in ‘the context of an expansionary
budgetary policy’.
Unfortunately, there is virtually no empirical evidence in support of any of
these points, as will be shown later in this chapter.
But what was the basis for these fears that a small (about 0.3% of GDP in
cyclically adjusted terms) reduction in the surplus would lead to a danger
for inflation? In the light of the evidence presented below, we conclude
that this episode illustrates effectively both our lack of knowledge of the
effects of fiscal policy and the dangers of fiscal fine-tuning by any
authority, whether national or supra-national.
In fact, the action against Ireland
22 points to a more general issue: we
simply do not have strong empirical evidence on fiscal policy, of the kind
that has accumulated on monetary policy. While the empirical analysis of
this chapter is nowhere near the level of detail that would be necessary to
address most of the specific points raised by the Irish case, it does try to
take a step in the direction of illustrating the empirical relationship
                                                     
22 The action against Ireland certainly had its own peculiarities. It is true that
inflation in Ireland was 5.3% in 2000 compared to less than 1% in 1999 in
France. Yet, as the Council recognises in its opinion on Ireland, ‘…this upsurge
in price inflation is partly due to external and temporary factors, which are
expected to fall gradually out of the consumer price index’. It might also well be
the case that there was a political dimension to this affair, but any exploration of
that dimension would go far beyond the scope of this contribution.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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between fiscal policy on the one hand and output and inflation on the
other.
23
Precisely because we know so little about the effects of fiscal policy, one
should be cautious about calls for further coordination of fiscal policies in
Europe. Almost invariably, coordination is associated with centralisation,
in which a supra-national body would dictate fiscal policies to individual
countries to a far greater degree than is the effect of the pressure currently
being exerted in the framework of the Growth and Stability Pact and the
major economic policy guidelines. Perhaps not surprisingly, in the recent
proposal for an overhaul of the European Union by the Commission, this
supra-national body is the Commission itself:
Policy co-ordination should make it possible to attain a
common assessment of the economic situation, agree on the
orientation of the policy response and monitor its
implementation. It should be regular, not limited to exceptional
circumstances…The instruments of economic policy
coordination, particularly the major economic policy guidelines
and the opinions on the stability and convergence programmes
should be drafted on the basis of proposals from the
Commission rather than mere recommendations from which the
Council may depart by qualified majority. (European
Commission (2002, p. 7).
In light of our current ignorance of fiscal policy, entrusting more powers
to an institution that has often tried to engage in fine-tuning without any
supporting evidence appears unwarranted, and possibly dangerous.
2. Large-scale econometric models as guides to policy-makers
As seems to occur in all slowdowns, one hears increasingly vociferous
calls for the use of fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical tool. Perhaps the
most recurrent argument in favour of fiscal activism is the positive effects
of a fiscal expansion on private consumption; and perhaps the most
common counter-argument is the venerable cliché that fiscal policy just
takes too long to display its effects. But does it? As plausible as it is, this
notion is based on some intuition of the mechanism behind the multiplier
rather than on any empirical evidence; and, at one level, it might easily be
                                                     
23 This is not of course the first contribution on this topic. Recent contributions
that apply a similar time series methodology include Burnside, Eichenbaum and
Fisher (1999), Fatas and Mihov (2001), Favero (2002) and Uhlig (2002).THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY
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wrong: government spending on goods and services is, after all, itself a
component of GDP.
But our ignorance is deeper than that. Theory does not even give us the
sign of the effects of fiscal policy instruments on the components of GDP
with any reasonable confidence. Indeed, Keynesian and neo-classical
theories make opposite predictions on the effect of a shock to government
purchases on private consumption; and there is some recent evidence that
this effect might switch sign, depending on conditions such as the
debt/GDP ratio (see e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano, 1989, and Perotti, 1999).
Policy-makers are then often tempted to turn for guidance to the existing
large-scale econometric models maintained and used by international
organisations. It is not widely appreciated that these models, including
that of the European Commission, largely assume the answer. Consider
for instance the response of private consumption to an increase in
government spending on goods and services. Many modern large-scale
econometric models, including the European Commission’s QUEST II
and the IMF’s MULTIMOD, specify private consumption as the sum of
consumption by two types of agents: unconstrained agents of the
‘Blanchard-Yaari’ type, namely infinitely lived individuals who face a
constant probability of death each period, hence effectively discounting
the future at a higher rate than the rate of time preference; and
constrained agents, who do not have access to credit markets and are
therefore obliged to consume all their disposable income in each period.
The ‘Blanchard-Yaari’ assumption effectively shuts off Ricardian
Equivalence, and introduces a role for changes in taxes in affecting the
consumption even of unconstrained individuals.
For this group of individuals, a permanent increase in government
consumption causes a fall in consumption (if they do not discount the
future too much), as the future increase in taxation causes their wealth to
fall. For constrained individuals, future taxes are irrelevant and an
increase in government consumption causes an increase in private
consumption. Of course, the overall effect depends on the relative
proportion of constrained and unconstrained individuals.
Let us take the models of the IMF and the European Commission as
examples. It turns out that a key difference in the specification of the
private-sector behaviour of MULTIMOD and QUEST II is precisely in
the share of constrained agents they assume: QUEST II assumes a very
small share, 0.3 in all countries; MULTIMOD a much larger share,
ranging from about .5 in Germany and the UK to .75 in Canada. In fact,
in QUEST II an increase in government spending financed by a futureFISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
76
increase in taxes causes a fall in private consumption; in MULTIMOD,
an increase (see European Commission, 1997, Masson, Symansky and
Meredith, 1990 and IMF, 2001). While there are other differences in the
specification of the consumption function and in the simulation scenarios,
the share of constrained individuals most likely plays an important role in
these simulation outcomes. Considering that we have so little evidence on
this parameter, it would seem rather dangerous to base any policy
conclusion on such flimsy foundations.
3. Approaches to estimating the effects of fiscal policy
A more empirically grounded approach is called for. The main
methodological innovation in the recent contributions that investigate the
effects of fiscal policy consists of applying a time series approach that
has long been applied to the analysis of monetary policy – Vector
Autoregressions. VARs allow a relatively unstructured specification of
the dynamics of the model, an especially attractive feature when, as in
our case, one would like to first investigate the basic multivariate time
series properties of the data.
The evidence presented in this chapter is obtained by estimating a model
that includes government purchases of goods and services, net taxes,
GDP (all in real and per capita terms), the GDP deflator and a nominal, 3-
month interest rate. Each of these variables is regressed on four lags of
itself and of all other variables, thus generating the reduced form of the
system.
It is tempting to think of the residual from regression of government
spending and of net taxes as fiscal shocks, which could be then fed
through the whole dynamic model to generate the impulse responses of
output, inflation and interest rates to fiscal shocks. This would not be
quite right, however, because government spending and especially taxes
respond to output and inflation. For instance, income taxes typically
increase automatically when output increases: if the researcher regresses
output on taxes, he is likely to find a positive coefficient. But it would be
wrong to interpret this coefficient as evidence of a negative effect of
exogenous changes in taxation on output; rather, it is only a manifestation
of reverse causation.
24
                                                     
24 This problem is not really different from the one encountered in monetary
policy VARs, and from the more general problem of identification.THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY
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Thus, it is crucial to deal with the problem of endogeneity of fiscal
policy; unfortunately, as is the case with all identification procedures,
there is more than one possible approach.
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter is based on a
methodology developed in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), extended to deal
with interest rates and prices. The key to identifying shocks to
government spending on goods and services (the sum of government
consumption and government investment) is based on a simple
observation of the institutional characteristics of fiscal policy-making: it
takes more than one quarter for policy-makers to implement discretionary
changes in government spending in response to shocks to output or
prices. Hence, all the estimated effects of output and prices on
government spending occur automatically.  Now suppose that one has
estimated a reduced form equation for real government spending as a
function of its own lags and lags in other endogenous variables, such as
output and prices; and suppose that one has some outside estimate of the
elasticity of real government spending to prices. By subtracting the price
shock multiplied by this elasticity from the government spending shock,
what is left is an estimate of the discretionary shock to government
spending. This can be then be fed through the estimated dynamic system
to give an estimate of the response of all endogenous variables of interest
to a government spending shock.
Thus, the key identifying assumption is that policy-makers cannot
intentionally react to changes in output and prices contemporaneously,
but only with a lag. This is plausible if one has data available at a
sufficiently high frequency, say a quarter: by the time the policy-makers
learn about a GDP shock, take a fiscal measure, pass it through
Parliament and implement it, certainly more than a quarter has elapsed.
This identifying assumption is less plausible with annual data.
To apply this logic, therefore, one needs data at least at quarterly
frequency. In addition, what matters for the private sector is expenditure
and taxation by the whole general government, not just the central
government. Finally, economic theory suggests that different types of
expenditure and taxation should have different effects and different
elasticities. Hence it is important to use disaggregated figures. Quarterly
disaggregated data for the general government are easily available onlyFISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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for the US, which explains the almost exclusive focus on this country in
the recent batch of studies.
25
The present contribution uses quarterly figures for the general
government that have been assembled from national sources, and are
described in Perotti (2002). The dataset covers four countries: Canada,
Germany, the UK and the US, and the period 1960-2001, except for
Germany when it stops at 1989 due to the reunification.
While these countries have different government sizes, ranging from
31.5% in the US to 43% in West Germany in 1990, it is interesting to
note that they have more similar average shares of government spending
GDP ratios, ranging from 19.4% in the US to 25.5% in Canada in the
same year (see Table 3.1 below).
Table 3.1  General government revenues and government spending* as
a share of GDP, 1990
Revenue/GDP Govt. spending/GDP
Canada 41.1 25.5
UK 39.7 22.9
US 31.5 19.4
West Germany 43.0 20.5
* Defined as government final consumption + government gross fixed capital formation.
Source: OECD data.
Thus, currently only one Euroland country is in the sample – Germany –
and two European countries in total. Ideally one would want to have more
European countries in the sample, but this is not possible at the present
time because of a lack of data.
26
One should also keep in mind that the countries in the sample were on a
flexible exchange rate regime (FER) during most of the estimation
                                                     
25 An exception is Favero, 2002, who uses half-year data for four European
countries; only the data for Germany, however, are not interpolated from yearly
figures.
26 Among the remaining European countries, France also maintains a dataset of
quarterly national income accounts covering a long enough period (since 1970).
However, it is not yet clear which government budget series are really genuine
quarterly data, and which are interpolated from annual data. We are currently
investigating this question.THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY
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period. Thus, strictly speaking, the evidence presented in this chapter
mostly applies to fiscal policy changes in Euroland as a whole, rather
than in individual countries. As we will see, however, since the interest
rate in general does not move much in response to fiscal policy shocks, it
is unlikely that the exchange rate regime could make a dramatic
difference in the estimated effects of fiscal policy shocks on output.
4. The effects of fiscal policy on output
We now begin by displaying the empirical evidence, based on the
methodology briefly illustrated above, on the effects of government
spending on output (Figure 3.1). Because the estimation covers a rather
long period in most countries, with large swings in fiscal policy and
occasional large changes, it is important to check the stability of the
results in different sub-periods.
Consider first the US, the country that has been studied the most
extensively so far. In the whole sample, the response of GDP to a positive
shock to government spending on goods and services of one percentage
point (pp) of GDP has an inverted-U shape: after an initial impact
increase by about .4 pp, GDP keeps increasing steadily until it peaks at
1.5 pp after 15 quarters, and then starts dying out slowly. A very similar
response obtains in the post-Bretton Woods (FER) sample, starting in Q2
of 1973, except that the impact effect is virtually 0.
This picture hides a very substantial difference between the first and
second parts of the sample, however. In the first half, until 1980, the
effect of a government spending shock on GDP is large and fairly
precisely estimated, with an impact response of .8 pp, which peaks after
10 quarters at about 2 pp of GDP, and is significant. In the second half of
the sample, the effect is zero or negative, and always insignificant.
In virtually all countries in our sample, fiscal policy was active between
1973 and 1976, with large positive and negative changes, at the same
time that inflation also surged because of the oil shock. It is therefore
important to check the robustness of the results to the exclusion of this
period of high activity. In fact, in the whole sample, in the FER sample
and in the pre-1980 sample, only the positive impact effect survives if the
1973–76 period is excluded; after the impact effect, the output response
fluctuates  around  zero  and  is  always  entirely  insignificant.  It remainsFISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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true, however, that the impact effect is positive and significant in the first
half, and negative and insignificant in the second half.
27
Let us consider now the other countries. The impact effect on GDP in
Canada is positive and significant, and of the same order of magnitude as
in the US, i.e. about .4 pp of GDP. The effect stays positive throughout
the horizon of the impulse response, but it becomes insignificant after a
few quarters.
Once again, there is a considerable difference between sub-periods. In the
first half of the period, both the impact effect and the peak effect are
positive and significant, at .6 pp and .9 pp (after four years), respectively.
Hence, the shape and timing of the response is similar to the US case,
although the peak effect is about half that in the US. By contrast, except
for a small positive initial impact effect, the output response becomes
negative and significant after two quarters in the FER regime, with a
negative peak of -1.2 pp after four years, and in the second half sample,
where the negative peak is more than -2.5 pp.
Over the whole sample, the UK presents a similar picture to Canada, but
a more muted one. Only on impact is the response of GDP significant,
and similar in magnitude to that of the US and Canada, at about .4 pp;
after that, it declines and quickly becomes insignificant. The response is
slightly stronger in the FER period, with a peak at about .9 pp of GDP
after about five years.
The pattern over the two sub-samples is by now familiar: in the first 20
years, one observes a positive impact and peak response at .7 and .9 pp
after 4 years, hence very similar to Canada. In the second sub-sample,
there is a negative response.
In Germany, the impact effect on GDP is positive and large, about 1.3 pp,
but the response quickly becomes insignificant thereafter. Because of the
reunification, Germany has only 30 years of observations, not enough to
split the sample in two. But again the same pattern emerges when one
compares results by excluding the last decades of the sample – the 1980s
– and the first decade. The impact response is much larger in the period to
1979, about 1.6 pp, than in the period after 1970, about .6 pp. Even after
the impact effect, the output response is consistently smaller in the period
after 1971 (also the FER period) than in the period up to 1979.
                                                     
27 Of course, the treatment of outliers is a controversial statistical issue. One may
argue that the 1973-76 period is precisely the more informative, and should not
be thrown away.THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY
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To summarise, despite some variation, the evidence displays a few
consistent results:
i)  The impact effect on output of a government spending shock is very
similar in all countries, at .4 pp of GDP, except for Germany, where
it is about 1.3 pp; in the post-1980
28 period, however, the impact
effect is however essentially zero, except in Germany where it is
about .6 pp.
ii)  The peak effect occurs on impact in all countries except the US,
where it builds up for about four years, and it is smaller than 1 or
slightly higher; however, in the post-1980 period, the peak effect
becomes zero or insignificant.
iii)  A negative response of GDP is not unusual: in fact, in the post-1980
period the output response after some three to five years becomes
consistently negative and statistically significant.
5. The effects of fiscal policy on prices
Estimating the response of prices to government spending runs into the
same conceptual problem as the estimation of the output response.
Holding constant the previous quarter’s price level, a shock to this
quarter’s price level (that is, a shock to inflation) typically causes an
increase in real tax revenues, because of the ‘tax creeping’ effect. If
government spending is budgeted in nominal terms, it also causes a one-
to-one fall in real government spending; if instead government spending
is perfectly indexed, the inflation shock has no automatic effect on real
government spending.
These arguments illustrate a key difficulty in estimating the effects of
government spending on prices: we have even less information on the
elasticity of government spending and taxes to inflation than on their
elasticity to output. It is however likely that the elasticity of real
government spending is between the two extremes of 0 and -1. The
results presented below (Figure 3.2) refer to the case of an elasticity of
-.5. The price level is taken to be the GDP deflator: results with the CPI
are similar.
                                                     
28 In the case of Germany, the expression ‘post-1980 period’ should be
interpreted as ‘post-1970 period’.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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On impact, the effect of government spending on the price level is always
essentially zero, except in Germany where it is positive, albeit small.
Over time, the effect over the whole sample is positive in all countries
except the US.
29
The breakdown into sub-periods mirrors the findings for output. In all
countries, in the first sub-period the response of inflation is positive and
significant after some quarters, although it is significant on impact only in
Germany. In contrast, there is no evidence of a positive and significant
price response in the second sub-period, or in the FER period.
30
6. The effects of fiscal policy on interest rates
It is typically assumed that shocks to fiscal policy are associated with
increases in interest rates for two sets of reasons: the central bank is likely
to react by increasing the interest rate under its control, and (for longer-
term interest rates) the increased deficit creates expectations of future
inflation.
In the present framework, it is not clear how to treat interest rate shocks
relative to fiscal policy shocks. Within each quarter, one can think of the
residual of a regression of the reduced form interest rate innovation on
the reduced form output and price innovations as the structural shock to
monetary policy, and of the reduced form government spending
innovation as the structural innovation in fiscal policy. Which one comes
‘first’? Do fiscal authorities react to policy innovations introduced by
monetary authorities, or vice versa? There is no way to tell. Fortunately,
it turns out that the assumption one makes in this regard has little
consequence for the response of output; it does have some consequence
for the response of the interest rate, but only in the first few quarters.
Let us first assume that the government spending shock comes first.
Strictly speaking, this exercise obviously makes sense only in a flexible
exchange rate regime (unless government-spending shocks represent
common shocks to all countries).
Over the whole sample, the interest rate increases in all countries except
the US, which again stands out as an outlier. Typically, the interest rate
                                                     
29 Thus, it appears that the results in Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Uhlig (2002),
who find a negative effect of government spending shocks on prices in the US,
are not representative of other developed countries.
30 A partial exception is Canada, where after about two years the price response
becomes significant in the FER period.THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY
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response takes a few quarters to peak, and then dies out. If however one
takes only the FER period, only in Canada and Germany is there evidence
of a very short-lived statistically significant increase in the interest rate
after a government spending shock.
Now assume the interest rate shock comes first. In other words, we now
look at the response of the interest rate to that part of the government
spending innovation that is orthogonal to the interest rate policy shock.
31
Not surprisingly, the impact response of the interest rate is now slightly
more muted; but the shape of the response is very similar, if also more
muted.
32
7. Conclusions
The starting point of our discussion in this chapter has been the fact that
there is almost no direct empirical evidence of the impact of fiscal policy
on output and prices. The existing large macroeconomic models are based
mainly on assumptions concerning some critical parameters. There might
be a reason for this state of affairs: somewhat surprisingly, the data one
would need to estimate directly the effectiveness of fiscal policy simply
does not exist for many countries. After a long and careful search for
data, we were able to perform rigorous statistical tests for four OECD
countries (Canada, Germany, the UK and the US). These are the only
countries for which data is available at the required frequency.
33
While these countries might at first sight not appear to be typical of the
average euro area country, we are encouraged by the fact that the
evidence displays a few consistent results across countries, which should
thus be of a more general nature:
i)  In all countries, GDP responds immediately to an increase in
government spending; however, this response has been virtually 0
since 1980 and in the flexible exchange rate period.
ii)  After this initial response, there is evidence that the output response
builds up over time only in one country, the US; however, since
                                                     
31 The interest rate response is still different from zero, because the interest rate
is allowed to move in response to changes in output and prices.
32 It is important to emphasise that these results are robust to the introduction of a
commodity price variable in the VAR.
33 To repeat once more: some leading data sources appear to give quarterly data
for many more countries. But a closer investigation revealed that these data are
interpolated, and thus useless for our empirical work.FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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1980 even this delayed response is not present any more, and in all
countries the output response is zero or negative.
iii)  Indeed, a negative and significant response of GDP is not unusual. In
fact, since 1980, it occurs in all countries in the sample three to five
years after the shock.
iv)  Whether the multiplier on total GDP is small, zero or negative, the
implied effect on private GDP is negative. In fact, there is evidence
of a negative response of both private consumption and private
investment in the post-1980 period.
v)  The impact on prices is, at least since 1980, never significant.
All in all, it appears that the power of discretionary fiscal policy to
stabilise the economy in the face of short-term demand shocks is quite
limited. But the reverse of this result is that fiscal policy also has little
influence on inflation. This might imply that there is also less need for an
explicit coordination of fiscal and monetary policy than often assumed.
A second important policy implication of these results is that they bear
little support for the recent wave of arguments in favour of a revision of
the Stability and Growth Pact. While the recent increase in budget
deficits throughout the eurozone is small by historical standards in a
recession, on the basis of our empirical evidence it appears that their
benefits in terms of demand stimulus are also likely to be small, or
negative.
In particular, one should be wary of proposed revisions of the Growth and
Stability Pact that would allow countries to finance government
investment by borrowing (the Golden Rule). Currently, there is little or no
evidence that the returns to government investment are so high that it
would simply ‘pay for itself’, as proponents of the Golden Rule maintain.
In addition, a Golden Rule would create strong incentives for
governments to reclassify large parts of current expenditure as capital
expenditure.89
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
hat is the key strategic issue for economic policy in the euro
area today? In our view it is how to adapt economic policy to
the tighter constraints implicit in a low-growth environment.
The first chapter of this report documented an important slowdown of
productivity, which became particularly acute during 2001. Europe (at
least in the north) has been gaining momentum in adopting information
technologies. A lack of IT investment cannot be the full story. But the
lack of labour market reform as well as the still unaccomplished internal
market in services combined with some countries' unwillingness to make
this sector more competitive may preclude euro-area economies from
realising the full gains of their IT investment. Hence a productivity
paradox could be emerging in Europe. Some observers have lauded the
slowdown in productivity, seeing it as a sign for improving employment
rates. We remain sceptical towards theories that explain worsening
productivity as the transitional response to higher employment growth
while adopting new technologies. Rather, we view the slowdown in
productivity as a disquieting long-term trend.
The second chapter showed how the ECB has for some time now not
been able to force inflation below its target of 2% because of a succession
of shocks to inflation. The phenomena of low productivity and high
inflation represent to a large extent just two sides of the same coin.
Indeed both the slowdown in productivity and the animal diseases that
caused a spike in food prices are adverse supply shocks – the former
likely to be more persistent than the latter.
1. Disappointing productivity
Where does the drastic slowdown in productivity come from? The service
sector seems decisive here. In Chapter 1 we argued that the differences in
the adoption of IT technology across the EU often coincide with a
reluctant service sector liberalisation. The detailed analysis of the
component of the CPI basket performed in Chapter 2 also points to the
services sector as a key factor. The importance of this sector, which
accounts after all for roughly 70% of GDP, has been noted in a number of
analyses of productivity in the EU and the US. For the US it has been
estimated that most of the recent acceleration in productivity has been
due to advances in the services sector, for example retail and wholesale
WFISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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distribution. By contrast, the poor performance of the services sector in
the EU is a theme that has been running through a number of reports.
Most recently, the report on European competitiveness by the European
Commission (2002, p. 93) states: ‘Looking at market services only, one
notes that between the first and the second half of the nineties
productivity growth decelerated in European Union countries, while the
United States recorded a strong acceleration of productivity growth.’
Services happen to be the one sector having so far been comparatively
less affected by the internal market programme. Moreover, most services
are very labour-intensive. Many labour market institutions may be an
impediment to the adoption of new technologies or, if adopted, pose
constraints to the realisation of their full benefits. If then companies
decide to adopt new technologies such as IT, strong employment growth
can have an additional dampening effect on labour productivity in the
transition to a new balanced growth path. This brings us back to square
one or rather Chapter 1 with the results already emphasised.
There are thus two factors that combine to hinder services productivity
growth in Europe: lack of competition across borders and rigid (national)
labour markets. The first factor should become less important as the
internal market programme of the EU slowly extends to services. But the
chances for progress on the second factor, i.e. labour market
liberalisation, are low, as discussed in last year’s MPG report (Gros et al.,
2001) and we remain sceptical towards active labour market policies as
initiated in the Lisbon process. We also remain sceptical towards the
transitional trade-off between employment growth and productivity
decline; rather we tend to view the productivity differential vis-à-vis the
US as a phenomenon that is going to last for some time.
2. Monetary policy for a slow euro area
What are the implications of all this for monetary policy? Sluggish
productivity growth, like all adverse supply shocks, makes the task of
keeping inflation low more difficult for a central bank. This has to be
taken into account when assessing the inflationary impact of wage
settlements, developments in the external value of the euro and, more
generally, the impact on inflation of special shocks like the one that hit
Euroland in the period under review – from animal diseases to the
opportunity to re-print menus offered by the euro cash changeover.
The ECB has steered its course mid-way. On the one hand, it eased
monetary conditions in the face of the slowdown in activity (which in the
event was less marked than initially feared), but without losing its nerveCONCLUSIONS
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and being unduly aggressive. On the other, it has accepted that shocks
pushed the rate of inflation above the 2% threshold for 24 consecutive
months, mainly because inflation expectations rose far less than actual
inflation. So far so good. But can this continue indefinitely?
Since we think that the productivity slowdown is here to stay at least for
some time, we do not expect overall inflation to be easily contained
below 2%. Moreover, given that 2% is also the differential between
services and manufacturing price inflation in Europe (with the notable
exception of Germany), keeping the ECB’s ceiling might too often
require price deflation in an important sector. So the tension between
sensible monetary policy actions and the violation of the self-imposed 2%
limit is bound to recur and erode the ECB’s credibility.
The ECB’s definition of price stability is excessively severe in any event
as no other country has such a low ceiling. Raising the 2% upper limit for
inflation is the only sensible action. Delaying this action serves no
purpose whilst making the unavoidable change increasingly difficult –
even more so than it is now in order to mitigate the risk that increasing
the 2% threshold is misinterpreted as dilution of the anti-inflationary
discipline.
We therefore stand by our recommendation of last year, namely that the
ECB should aim at ‘keeping year-on-year core inflation at 1.5% with a
tolerance band of ±1%’.
This would still make the ECB more ambitious than most other central
banks with an explicit inflation target. But the explicit setting of this
target would also provide a much easier framework of communications
while maintaining an appropriate medium-term orientation for monetary
policy, given that core inflation is much less volatile than headline
inflation.
The change in the inflation limit would also offer the opportunity to
modify other aspects of the strategy, in particular getting rid of the first
pillar. Careful analysis of monetary developments is part and parcel of
central banking. But should the public be forced to follow arcane
technical explanations to understand why the ECB cuts policy rates when
money growth is nearly twice the reference value?
3. Can fiscal policy speed up Europe?
With monetary policy fully engaged in hitting a difficult inflation target,
could fiscal policy give the sluggish euro area a much-needed lift? The
answer seems to be a decisive no. Chapter 3 showed that, since 1980,FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY FOR A LOW-SPEED EUROPE
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government spending has had virtually no positive impact on overall
demand. The mechanisms of demand management policies – which
might have worked in the 1970s – seem no longer to hold. The fact that
an increase in public expenditure does not lift overall demand means that
such a ‘stimulus’ depresses private demand by the same amount,
implying 100% crowding out. Looking at the medium-run response of
GDP, we find an even stronger result. GDP falls three to five years after
an increase in public expenditure in all countries in our sample.
We have insisted on the evidence that the power of discretionary fiscal
policy to stabilise the economy in the face of short-term demand shocks
has become quite limited. But the reverse of this result is that fiscal
policy has little influence on inflation either. This implies also a less
pressing need for an explicit coordination of fiscal and monetary policy
than is often demanded. There is no need to create a new institution to
manage and coordinate fiscal policies in the euro area. Even the existing,
often rather complicated, procedures to discuss and coordinate fiscal
policy at the European level are, at best, of little use.
Another important policy implication of these results is that they bear
little support for the recent wave of arguments in favour of a revision of
the Stability and Growth Pact. While the recent increase in budget
deficits throughout the euro area is small by historical standards in a
recession, it appears on the basis of our empirical evidence that their
benefits in terms of demand stimulus are also likely to be very small, and
perhaps even negative.REFERENCES
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